

THE IDEA OF A EUROPEAN UKRAINE

BY

OleksandraLozytska

A Study

Presented to the Faculty

of

Wheaton College

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for

Graduation with Departmental Honors

In International Relations

Norton, Massachusetts

May 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	iii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: LEONID KRAVCHUCK (1991-1994).....	8
CHAPTER 3: LEONID KUCHMA (1994-2004).....	19
CHAPTER 4: VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO (2004-2010).....	31
CHAPTER 5: VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH (2010-2013).....	42
CHAPTER 6: EUROMAIDAN AND THE PRESENT TIME.....	50
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS.....	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	73
APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY.....	78
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTICIPANTS OF THE SURVEY.....	79

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	The Association Agreement
CFSP	The Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	The Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE	The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DPR	The Donetsk People's Republic
EU	The European Union
LPR	The Luhansk People's Republic
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	The Non-Proliferation Treaty
PCA	The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
START	The Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the Soviet Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades Ukraine has experienced some major social and political changes in different aspects of its life that have affected its population. The mentality of the population has shifted along with its political views, but the issue of defining a common national identity has remained, splitting Ukraine into two parts – pro-European Ukrainians and pro-Russian Ukrainians. This divided national identity problem has long been present in Ukraine due to its historical attachment to Russia and the fluctuation of its Western part between Eastern European countries.

The focus on the study of identities has intensified since the late 1980s with the changing world order and global politics.¹ The topic of nationalism has not been closely addressed up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,² making Ukraine a newly established independent and sovereign country with little sense of a firm and stable identification as a united Ukrainian nation. The reason I decided to address the matter of a European Ukraine is because today the country is not the same as it was a few years ago. It has a European sentiment, which drives it to accomplish more results in order to take a step on to a new level of development. Two-thirds of Ukrainians today want to join the EU³ and are feeling more pro-European than pro-Russian, the

¹Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 140, doi:10.1177/1354066196002002001.

²Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “What Is Ethnicity?,” in *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, 2 edition (London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2002), 1–18.

³Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, “Ukrainian Public Opinion: Dissatisfied with Current Conditions, Looking for an End to the Crisis,” *Pew Research Center’s Global*

government is weak but is taking confident steps towards the Europeanization of the country, and the willingness to be in Europe has been proven by the two major revolutions in 2004 and 2013. In order to support my argument, I will look back to the very beginning of Ukraine's independent existence and analyze social and political attitudes towards this idea through the years of the presidential terms of Ukrainian leaders.

The building of a national identity is a very long and gradual process if different regions of a country like Ukraine have been torn apart throughout its history. It requires years of social consent on domestic and foreign policy issues, as well as an encouraging, flexible national governing system that has few domestic disagreements. Unfortunately, this model does not fit Ukraine, and thus, the unification of the population is much more challenging. As scholars began to examine the situation of Ukraine, they came up with the two titles for the two main variations of national identity – “Ethnic Ukrainian” and “Eastern Slavic.” Ukrainians are divided between the West of the country, which experiences more Ukrainian nationalist sentiment, and the East, which feels more connected to Russia. I will be using these two models further in my paper to provide quantitative data on public opinion.

Ukrainian nationalism itself is a very complicated notion that could be comprehended on different levels. Various scholars have tried to explain this case by applying some fundamental theories of nationalism, but not one of them could explain the Ukrainian case fully. The national present is directly explained by the ethnic past of the country, according to Adam Smith (Smith, 10). From this perspective, the strong current nationalistic sentiment in Ukraine originates out of the constant fight for the independence of ethnic Ukrainians in the past. Under the rule of different countries, original ethnic Ukrainians have always fought for the independence of their

Attitudes Project, accessed November 2, 2015, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/3-ukrainian-public-opinion-dissatisfied-with-current-conditions-looking-for-an-end-to-the-crisis/>.

population, carrying this idea throughout Ukraine's history. Kyiv (or Kiev in Russian language) was created before Moscow and gave the name to KievanRus, which consisted of different nations that were united, but were still maintaining their own identities. Later, the main purpose of the Ukrainian Cossacks in the 15th century was to separate the Ukrainian nation from Russian control and fight for independence. More importantly, albeit briefly, Ukraine was an independent state in 1919,⁴ a fact that no one pays enough attention to. After the Tsar's overthrow in 1917, Ukraine was proclaimed an independent state by Finland due to the rapid formation of the Ukrainian provisional government and the desire to be sovereign. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk ordered Russian Bolshevik troops to leave the territory of Ukraine. Germany and Austria showed their strong support for preserving Ukrainian independence, which demonstrates that Western Europe has been advocating for Ukraine as a separate state. Unfortunately, this independence did not last long because of Ukraine's weak state and Russia's ability to take control over Ukraine, which became part of the Soviet Union in 1922.⁵ Relying on history, the fact that Ukraine has shown a strong interest over the years to become disintegrated from Russia's influence is legitimate.

Ronald Suny proposes, "National identity is a particular form of political identification."⁶ This statement applies very well to the case of Ukraine due to the habit of Ukrainian people to identify with the government that is in control. Even though the opposition is powerful, and the country has always had several political interests; what determines Ukrainian identity at any point in time and what it looks like from the outside is the existing president and his political

⁴"Ukraine Declares Its Independence - Jan 26, 1918," *HISTORY.com*, accessed November 2, 2015, <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ukraine-declares-its-independence>.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ronald Grigor Suny, "Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia," 2006, 144, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228899560266>.

views. For example, under the former president Viktor Yushchenko, who had very liberal Western goals, the country was seen as being more democratic with European ambitions. On the other hand, when a pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was in power, Ukraine was seen as a stagnated developing country that was recreating the Soviet lifestyle. Due to the absence of agreement between competing political groups among Ukrainian elites, the attitude towards Russia and the West is depicted in many different ways.⁷

The image of the nation is of the utmost importance in international relations, and according to Kenneth Boulding, this image is typically imposed on the masses by the powerful within a state. The mass of ordinary people is deeply affected by the decisions of the powerful individuals, but this mass has almost no influence on the elites.⁸ The mindset of the Ukrainian population was very much influenced by the governing of certain presidents and the opposition could not exercise enough power in order to be influential. In addition, the European Union was reluctant to help Ukraine during the authoritative pro-Russian governing regimes, but supportive during more democratic and open rulings. This supports the point that the impact of national images in the course of events in the international arena is very significant. For this reason I consider analyzing the European sentiment in Ukraine under every president's term since its independence to be useful in supporting my main idea regarding the place of Ukraine in Europe.

Another way to understand the formation of Ukrainian national identity is described by Iver Neumann and interpreted by TarasKuzio in relation to Ukraine and Russia's relationship. They argue that the distinction between "the self and other" leads to the determination of an

⁷Taras Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other,'" *Ethnicities* 1, no. 3 (2001): 344, <http://etn.sagepub.com/content/1/3/343.short>.

⁸Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1959, 121, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173107>.

identity, “without ‘Otherness’ a bounded in-group will be difficult to construct.”⁹ Russia and Ukraine will always have historical and political connection, but they will be “the self and other” in a cultural way because the political views change and so do people’s perceptions. Thus, if applied exclusively to Ukraine, this theory suggests that Pro-European Ukrainians and pro-Russian Ukrainians are the self and other, but the issue could be to define who is whom. I strongly stand by the idea that the “other” is the 11% of Ukrainians¹⁰ who feel less Western and want to establish closer ties with Russia, because the uprisings in Ukraine were driven by the nationalistic pro-European part of the population. Seventy two percent of Ukrainians choose the EU over Russia.¹¹ This clearly represents the unwillingness to be the “other” and share their ideas and interests. The issue with this theory is that it does not solve the inner disputes between the regions in Ukraine, but rather enhances them without creating a stable national identity.

Given that national identity is never fixed but in a state of constant flux and evolution,¹² Ukrainian identification could be seen as being in transition from a Soviet to a European one. “The populations do not identify themselves with the national image of the dominant group. When one nation conquers another and absorbs the conquered territory in to an empire, it does not thereby automatically change the culture and allegiances of the conquered nation.”¹³ People in Ukraine who are very familiar with their history understand what it means to be Ukrainian, because even under another country’s rule this country has maintained its language, customs, and nationalistic ideas. Unfortunately, the separation between the regions, currently intensified by

⁹Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the ‘Other,’” 345.

¹⁰Simmons, Stokes, and Poushter, “3. Ukrainian Public Opinion.”

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the ‘Other,’” 344.

¹³Boulding, “National Images and International Systems,” 124.

Russia's influence on the Eastern regions, does not make it easier to establish a unified country with shared ideas and interests that are tied closely to identities.

As a result, Ukraine fits with some aspects of different theories of nationalism and nation building, but it has such a specific geopolitical situation connected to its domestic regional disputes that it is hard to fully link it to one theory that would provide a holistic explanation of a Ukrainian national identity. Thus, I have decided to use the two competing types of nationalisms present in Ukraine, outlined by Shulman and Kuzio – “Ethnic Ukrainian” and “Eastern Slavic.”¹⁴ Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism is described as more supportive of democratic reforms and an independent pro-European Ukraine, whereas eastern Slavic identity consists of weaker support for liberal democracy, is more pro-Russian, and less supportive of integration into Europe.¹⁵ The Western part of the country is pro-European due to its history. While the Eastern part remained a part of Russia nearly all of Ukraine's history, the West was under the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, which was more liberal in its ruling and did not suppress Ukrainian nation-building.¹⁶ This division is very accurate in its framework and explanation of the characteristics of both identities. Thus, in my opinion, it provides a good outline of the clashes between the two nationalisms and the impact they have on Ukraine's path to Europe.

Moreover, there is a direct connection between the two above mentioned types of identities and such notions as ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism,’ which gained increased political significance at the end of the 20th century. In his study, Thomas Eriksen states that the relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is seen as a complex one. Nonetheless, given that ‘ethnicity’ itself is a

¹⁴Taras Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, no. 3 (September 2010): 286, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2010.07.001.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 290–291.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 286.

new term, which was only first used in 1953, there has been a growing interconnectedness between the two concepts. Ethnicity connotes a sense of group cultural identity. Nationalism is also tied to cultural ideologies but goes further insofar as it connotes a political structural aspect.¹⁷ Therefore, the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic nationalisms, existing within one state, have distinct political preferences and conceptions of national identity.

Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism is one of the most powerful forces driving Ukraine today towards the West and helping it to overcome its major difficulties: war and economic crisis. This type of nationalism has also proven to be “more adept at mobilizing Ukrainians than did eastern Slavic nationalism,” which “has reacted to, rather than initiated or supported, protests and democratic breakthroughs in Ukraine from the late 1980s to the 2004 Orange Revolution.”¹⁸ Stability is more valued than change for the Eastern part of Ukraine, indicating the same mindset that was present among people in the Soviet Union. As Suny noticed, in the beginning years of Ukraine’s independence, the population had no guiding image of what the national identity was, as was the case in the Soviet era.¹⁹ This and many other reasons lead me to the argument that Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism is going to convert Ukraine to a European country and lead it to be an official part of the European Union.

¹⁷Eriksen, “What Is Ethnicity?”

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 290–295.

¹⁹Suny, “Provisional Stabilities,” 140.

CHAPTER 2

LEONID KRAVCHUK (1991-1994)

Once the USSR collapsed in 1991, Ukraine was born a new country with only brief experience of self-governance as an independent state with no clearly defined national identity. Unlike other Eastern and Central European countries that started their modernization process right away, Ukraine was stuck with the Soviet label and mentality for a much longer time, and its lack of direction and indecisiveness made its transition more problematic.²⁰ Not only was Ukraine struggling as a brand-new state in all areas of its functioning, but it was also facing such difficulties as international recognition of its sovereignty, mostly denied by Russia and some European countries due to its middle geographical position in between them. Because Ukraine was under Russian rule for the majority of its history, and therefore has always been associated with a Russian national identity, a few European countries did not want to acknowledge Ukraine as a European state, even though it is located within the continental boundaries of Europe. In addition, having had Ukraine by its side for centuries, at first Russian people, including the democratic-oriented population, refused to recognize its independence taking a “temporary, [due to its] ambiguous attitude toward Ukrainian statehood.”²¹

The process of Ukrainian state-building started in the first half of the 1990s with a plethora of internal constraints that slowed down significantly its international development as well. Right after the declaration of its independence, Ukraine was completely disorganized politically, economically, and socially. One of the first important issues that arose on the agenda was the problem of the constitutional status of the regions of Ukraine, because it was still framed

²⁰F. Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine’s Place in European and Regional Security,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 250, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036693>.

²¹*Ibid.*, 251.

by the Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1978. Other issues were the problematic state budget system and the major contradictions between political forces on which ideology to construct a national identity.²²

The first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, was popularly elected in 1991, and encountered this overall disorder, as well as facing such issues as regional disputes, economic stagnation, “a potential constitutional crisis,”²³ and confrontations between the post communist Ukrainian political elites that were characterized as “extremely unconsolidated.”²⁴ The problem of continued tensions between political forces lay in the differences of their baseline beliefs and visions of Ukrainian statehood. On the one hand, there was a part of the elite that sought to construct a new state based on democratic values, although only a few of those representatives could comprehend this concept entirely and provide a detailed explanation of Western democratic principles. On the other hand, there were members of the political elite in favor of sticking to the past and standing for the creation of Ukraine based on Soviet philosophes and moralities.²⁵

As Ronald Suny argued, “[i]n a number of republics, [including Ukraine], former Communists quickly adapted their political agendas to fit the new post-Communist period of nation building and to varying degrees adopted programs of democratization and

²²Павло Вікторович Сацький (Pavlo Viktorovych Satskyi), “Регіональний Фактор У Формуванні Загальнодержавної Вертикалі Виконавчої Влади В Україні У Першій Половині 1990-Х Рр., (Regional factor in shaping national vertical of executive power in Ukraine in the first half of the 1990s)” *Інститут Історії України НАН України*, 2007, 453, <http://www.ir.kneu.edu.ua:8080/handle/2010/8877>.

²³John J. Schulz, “Crimean Challenge Adds to Ukrainian Woes,” *Arms Control Today* 24, no. 3 (1994): 20, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23625511>.

²⁴Марія Кармазіна and Maria Karmazina, “Демократи, соціалісти й ‘третя сила’ у боротьбі за владу (1991-1994 рр.) (Democrats, Socialists, and the ‘Third Force’ in the Struggle for Power (1991-1994)),” *Політичний менеджмент* 6 (2005): 49, <http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/bitstream/handle/123456789/8898/6-karmazina.pdf?sequence=1>.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 49–50.

marketization.”²⁶ This description applies well to democratic representatives of the Ukrainian government in the post-Soviet era, and especially to the pro-Western President Leonid Kravchuk, who was the former Ideology Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.²⁷ In addition, during 1992-1993, there was a major effort to centralize power within the political system, mainly attempted by the so-called “Party of Power.” This term refers to former communists who managed to maintain their top authority positions in Ukrainian politics.²⁸ Kravchuk is often referred to as the head of the “Party of Power.” Kubicek indicates that Kravchuk did not belong to any registered political party and had “taken several steps along the path toward delegative democracy.”²⁹ The term ‘delegative democracy’ was applied very often to the studies of post-Soviet countries’ transformation from authoritarian and communist regimes to adopting liberal and democratic values; it could be also referred as “partial democracy.”³⁰

The disorder in the political sphere of the country put the President in a most unfavorable position of governance and created tensions between the legislative and executive powers during the very important process of state-building and the formation of constitutional and administrative-territorial structures.³¹ According to the Constitution, President Leonid Kravchuk was chief executive, but in reality he was unable to fully carry out executive functions because

²⁶Ronald Grigor Suny, “Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations,” *The Journal of Modern History* 73, no. 4 (2001): 877, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/340148>.

²⁷Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the ‘Other,’” 359.

²⁸Paul Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27, no. 4 (1994): 431, http://shron.chtyvo.org.ua/Kubicek_Paul/Delegative_democracy_in_Russia_and_Ukraine_anhl.pdf.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., 424.

³¹Сацький and Satskyi, “Регіональний фактор у формуванні загальнодержавної вертикалі виконавчої влади в Україні у першій половині 1990-х рр. (Regional Factor in Shaping National Vertical of Executive Power in Ukraine in the First Half of the 1990s),” 463.

VerkhovnaRada (Supreme Council of Ukraine³²) or the Parliament of Ukraine, along with the regional councils, were reluctant to cede their powers in favor of the presidential structures.³³ They also did not agree with Kravchuk's statement that, "All patriotic forces should be consolidated around the task of state-building, and overcome personal ambition and neglect 'insignificant' tactical discrepancies for the sake of a greater strategic goal."³⁴ Placing himself above politics,³⁵ Kravchuk had a lot of support from the center and center-right politicians who believed that he should be the Chairman of the VerkhovnaRada, and not one of the leaders of any parties for the reason that the conflicts in the Parliament would intensify.³⁶ As a result, the situation of "multi-governance," or polyarchy, prevailed in Ukraine, where each of the political forces believed that only their ideologies and visions of the reconstruction of Ukrainian society and state-building processes were able to rule the country.³⁷ In this case, the application of the notion of delegative democracy describes well the way politics developed in post-Soviet Ukraine where the existence of several ruling powers did not serve a democratic role because their focus was on gaining more power for their own benefit, instead of the country and its population. Moreover, there are some factors, such as "professional weakness, amorality, at times criminal

³²"Verkhovna Rada," *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*, February 9, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Verkhovna_Rada&oldid=704062580.

³³Сацький and Satskyi, "Регіональний фактор у формуванні загальнодержавної вертикалі виконавчої влади в Україні у першій половині 1990-х рр. (Regional Factor in Shaping National Vertical of Executive Power in Ukraine in the First Half of the 1990s)," 462–463.

³⁴Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," 431.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Лариса Полякова and Larysa Polyakova, "Аспекти взаємодії Президента України і Верховної Ради. Спроба посилення президентської влади (1994-2004 рр.) (Aspects of the Relationship between the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada. Attempt of Strengthening the Presidential Power (1994-2004))," *Схід* 5, no. 105 (2010): 105, <http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/22169>.

³⁷Кармазіна (Karmazina), "Демократи, Соціалісти Й 'Третя Сила' У Боротьбі За Владу (1991-1994 Рр.)," 52–53.

irresponsibility, and desire for wealth”³⁸ that all of the politicians had in common in the post-Soviet era, and which can be seen very often even today.

Leonid Kravchuk, as Ukraine’s leader during 1991-1994 was identified as more pro-European than pro-Russian, which was exemplified in his focus on Ukrainian nation- and state-building along with “distancing Ukraine as far as possible from the Russian ‘Other’ [as] Ukraine’s strategic priority.”³⁹ His political decisions and primary goals for the formation of the Ukrainian state and nation, both domestically and on the international level, were leaning towards the West. Russia could not tolerate Ukraine moving westward nor stabilizing as a nation on its own, which is why it used Ukraine’s economic dependence on gas and oil as a huge leverage and put a lot of pressure on Ukraine to become a member of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). Ukraine, on the other hand, declined any kind of integration (mostly political, economic, and military) with the CIS, but rather wanted to pursue exclusively economic cooperation.⁴⁰ Former Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, presented Russia’s skeptical view of Kravchuk’s political orientation during his visit to Kyiv for the second presidential elections in 1994, when he emphasized that “the pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma – unlike the ‘nationalist’ Kravchuk - could negotiate with Russia.”⁴¹

Kuzio argues that Kravchuk attempted to construct a Ukrainian state both ethnically and territorially as separate and distinct from Russia by adopting the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, which implied Ukraine’s perception of the Russian identity as the ‘Other’.⁴² Therefore, main objectives of Ukraine’s foreign policy consisted of gaining international recognition as a

³⁸Ibid., 56.

³⁹Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the ‘Other,’” 359.

⁴⁰F. Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine’s Place in European and Regional Security,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 252, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036693>.

⁴¹Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine,” 291.

⁴²Kuzio, “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the ‘Other,’” 356.

sovereign state and building close ties with the European community.⁴³ Kravchuk initiated the establishment of those relations during his visit to Germany a year into his presidency, where he signed a bilateral contract with Germany's most prominent authorities creating a base for the two countries' feasible cooperation.⁴⁴

In addition, the Ukrainian President proposed a couple of initiatives for cooperating with Ukraine's neighboring countries, which seemed too ambitious and worthless to the European countries for various reasons. For instance, in 1993 at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in Prague, Kuchma presented to the European community one of his first proposals, the main idea of which was the creation of a Central European Security Zone consisting of Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic States, and the Warsaw Pact members, except Russia. This idea did not gain any support because of the states' unwillingness to be seen openly as anti-Russian.⁴⁵ His second failed attempt to ally with Ukraine's neighbors and strengthen stability outside its boundaries was the idea of Baltic-Black Sea regional cooperation "as a bulwark against Russian domination."⁴⁶ The reason for this denial from Poland and the Baltics was very similar to the previous one with the distinction that their first priority was getting closer to the EU and NATO as the most efficient way to establish reliable security and cooperation.⁴⁷

The purpose of Kravchuk's various propositions was to create a secure and stable geopolitical environment for Ukraine as a means of protection from Russia and in order to pursue integration into Europe. Unfortunately, neither Ukraine as an independent state or

⁴³Borys Tarasyuk, "Ukraine in the World," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 9, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036682>.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁵Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," 1996, 262.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 264.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*

Kravchuk's attempts to reach out to Europe were taken seriously in the international arena. The European Union made it clear that Ukraine was not its priority by delaying the ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) for four years, which was finally signed by Leonid Kravchuk in June 1994.⁴⁸

The main concern of the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the need for the countries that contained nuclear weapons to disarm as soon as possible. Leonid Kravchuk did not oppose this demand from the international community, stating that Ukraine "has every intention to stick to whatever processes are geared toward the complete destruction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons."⁴⁹ In 1993, the European Commission emphasized that the European Council had interest in increasing its collaboration with Ukraine, which would improve greatly by Ukraine getting rid of its nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ By using potential cooperation with Ukraine in order to gain its own security, the European Union proved once again that Europe's plans at that time for Ukraine were minor.

President Kravchuk's emphasis on the state-building process had a negative impact on the economic development of the country, which did not make it to the top of Kravchuk's priority list. "Though the jovial Kravchuk appeared a plausible nation-builder and mediator between the nationalist west and the Russified eastern part of the country, his economic philosophy could best be summarized as neglect."⁵¹ Not only was there no interest in the development of economic policies from the head of the country, but also the weakness and

⁴⁸Taras Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," *The European Institute for Security Studies*, no. 47 (November 2003): 15, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ47.pdf>.

⁴⁹Dunbar Lockwood, "'Commonwealth' Leaders Pledge Arms Cuts, Central Control," *Arms Control Today* 21, no. 10 (1991): 24, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23624722>.

⁵⁰"European Commission," *European Commission*, n.d., http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm.

⁵¹Anders Aslund, "Left behind: Ukraine's Uncertain Transformation," *The National Interest*, 2003, 108, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42895646>.

Soviet-oriented mentality of the Ukrainian political elite contributed to the gradual degradation of Ukraine's economy.⁵²

Thus, during the first years of independence under Leonid Kravchuk, “support for nationalism (Ukrainian independence) and democratization went hand in hand with nation-building and [had] strengthened the pro-reform and pro-Western camp, that is ‘ethnic Ukrainian’ nationalism [...]”⁵³ This was reflected in the social reforms launched by Kravchuk and later, some of them continued by his successor, Leonid Kuchma, who held more of an Eastern Slavic orientation of national identity that he would try to impose on Ukraine.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, initiated by Kravchuk and implemented by Kuchma, there was an “overhaul of Soviet-era Ukrainian historiography”⁵⁵ in the educational institutions of Ukraine. This was one of Kravchuk's most significant achievements and contributions to the stabilization of Ukrainian national identity, because during the Soviet Union, there was a lot of conspiracy and fake modifications of some nations' history, including Ukraine's. The main reason for the preservation of Ukrainian nationality during the most severe times of Russification was the sense of nationalism of Ukrainian intellectuals who “defended and promoted their own culture and language.”⁵⁶

Moreover, another significant accomplishment under both rulers was the prevention of ethnic violence between various ethnic groups that exist in Ukraine,⁵⁷ the roots of which come from the times of the USSR as well. As for the Ukrainian population, support for the

⁵²Кармазіна (Karmazina), “Демократи, Соціалісти Й ‘Третя Сила’ У Боротьбі За Владу (1991-1994 Рр.),” 56.

⁵³Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine,” 291.

⁵⁴Stephen Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 5 (2005): 38, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10758216.2005.11052211>.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Suny, “Constructing Primordialism,” 875.

⁵⁷Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” 42.

independence of their country was 67% in the year 1992,⁵⁸ although the issue of self-identification prevailed within Ukrainians whose nationalism was generally divided into two opposite categories: Eastern Slavic (South-Eastern population with the pro-Russian orientation that either supported the old Soviet regime or wanted to reunite with Russia territorially) and Ethnic Ukrainian (pro-European population from the central and Western part of the country that advocated for democratic values of the West and considered Ukraine to be a European state). This division contributed to regional tensions both socially and politically, splitting Ukraine into two parts for the rest of its development even until this day.

To sum up, in the first years of the existence of a sovereign Ukrainian state under the government of President Leonid Kravchuk, there were both major developments and failures in the attempt to establish a structure and develop an independent prosperous country. As subtly noted by Karmazina, “Ukrainian society moved to the future driven by the history.”⁵⁹ Not only was Ukraine divided socially, but also politically, as former communist authorities were fighting for the pursuit of power. Based either on Soviet ideologies or new democratic values, Ukraine could not have developed successfully for the reason that no political force had enough knowledge, experience, nor ability to rule the country without putting self-interest and the desire to gain more power first. As a result, the formation of the polyarchic system of governance did not contribute positively to the development of a young state or the implementation of structural reforms,⁶⁰ nor was the President able to achieve a comprehensive distribution of executive

⁵⁸Ibid., 34.

⁵⁹Кармазіна (Karmazina), “Демократи, Соціалісти Й ‘Третя Сила’ У Боротьбі За Владу (1991-1994 Рр.),” 49.

⁶⁰Сацький (Satskyi), “Регіональний Фактор У Формуванні Загальнодержавної Вертикалі Виконавчої Влади В Україні У Першій Половині 1990-Х Рр.,” 459–460.

powers⁶¹ in the state. The leader of the nationalist party Rukh (Movement) for example, Larisa Skorik, stated that, “she could support a Ukrainian Pinochet and proposed that Kravchuk adopt harsh presidential rule to restore order to the country.”⁶² Furthermore, along with the absence of order, there was no economic program⁶³ in Ukraine. If in the beginning of Kravchuk’s presidential term he strongly believed that in a few years Ukrainians would live much better and that Ukraine would become a rich European country with worldwide respect, by the end of his term his optimistic aspirations dissipated,⁶⁴ and in February 1994 he announced that he was not going to run for re-election.⁶⁵

The demonstration of the low priority placed on Ukraine by its European neighbors made it more difficult for Ukraine to develop on its own given that the internal situation of the country was chaotic. Several academic sources mentioned that since Ukraine became a state on its own, “[it] transformed the geopolitics of Europe.”⁶⁶ And in this way, its development and pro-Western orientation were crucial for Europe’s security and the world’s stability. However, various political and economic factors prevented the international community from responding to Ukraine’s willingness of taking steps towards the west. For this reason, Kravchuk’s pro-Russian successor, Kuchma, would reestablish close ties with Russia and promise to “distance himself from the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism.”⁶⁷

⁶¹Ibid., 463.

⁶²Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” 433.

⁶³Paul Kubicek, “Reviewed Work: How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy by Anders Åslund,” *Slavic Review* 69, no. 2 (2010): 471, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25677124>.

⁶⁴Кармазіна (Karmazina), “Демократи, Соціалісти Й ‘Третя Сила’ У Боротьбі За Владу (1991-1994 Рр.),” 56.

⁶⁵Schulz, “Crimean Challenge Adds to Ukrainian Woes,” 20.

⁶⁶Larrabee, “Ukraine’s Place in European and Regional Security,” 1996, 251.

⁶⁷Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” 38.

Looking at the process of the development of the Ukrainian state since 1991 and taking into account its current situation, these unresolved domestic issues, which originated at the very beginning stage of Ukraine's evolution, have persisted throughout many years and different governments. They include regional disparities, the political system of poliarchy on the regional and national levels, constant tensions between political forces, and the absence of effective reform implementation. Until the truly democratic Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukraine existed under communist successor leaders and parties for thirteen years,⁶⁸ whose main foreign policy agenda was based on ties with Russia and the CIS, distancing Ukraine further away from Europe.

⁶⁸Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine," 288.

CHAPTER 3

LEONID KUCHMA (1994-2004)

Ukraine's crumbling economy during Kravchuk's presidency resulted in the strikes of coal and mine workers, which made him call for early elections.⁶⁹ This situation decreased the level of optimism within democratically-oriented Ukrainians as Leonid Kuchma, the former Soviet administrator and Prime Minister of Ukraine, replaced Leonid Kravchuk in July 1994.⁷⁰ Leonid Kuchma's presidential campaign focused on turning the government in the opposite direction of Kravchuk's Ethnic Ukrainian national identity orientation, and instead advocated for an Eastern Slavic nationalism.⁷¹ His position as a representative of the industrial elites' interests from the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine during his tenure as Prime Minister made his situation beneficial for the presidential elections because promising to strengthen ties with Russia brought him a lot of support from the industry-based Southeastern population of Ukraine.⁷² Kuchma was similar to Kravchuk to some degree: he was not a member of any political party⁷³ and desired to pursue power as well. Under the premiership he attempted to strengthen the executive branch, but once president, he implemented a few reforms directed to increase his presidential powers.⁷⁴ Nonetheless, his attitude towards politics was skeptical as he

⁶⁹Aslund, "Left behind," 108.

⁷⁰Кармазіна (Karmazina), "Демократи, соціалісти й 'третя сила' у боротьбі за владу (1991-1994 рр.) (Democrats, Socialists, and the 'Third Force' in the Struggle for Power (1991-1994))," 56.

⁷¹Shulman, "Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma," 38.

⁷²Сацький (Satskyi), "Регіональний фактор у формуванні загальнодержавної вертикалі виконавчої влади в Україні у першій половині 1990-х рр. (Regional Factor in Shaping National Vertical of Executive Power in Ukraine in the First Half of the 1990s)," 461.

⁷³Kubicek, "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine," 435.

⁷⁴Полякова (Polyakova), "Аспекти взаємодії Президента України і Верховної Ради. Спроба посилення президентської влади (1994-2004 рр.) (Aspects of the Relationship between the

referred to himself as a manager instead of a politician, criticizing that the economy was being dominated by politics.⁷⁵ Once elected, Kuchma stated: “My path to politics came from the administrative level.”⁷⁶

Even though the power was passed from one communist to another communist, Ukraine was the first of the CIS countries that had calm and democratic presidential elections.⁷⁷ Kubicek still argues that the “technocratically-minded Kuchma” would continue to drag Ukraine along under the principles of delegative democracy.⁷⁸ The first area that Kuchma paid attention to was the near-collapse of the Ukrainian economy, seeing it as the most important threat to the country’s security.⁷⁹ With a hyperinflation rate around 10,000 % in 1993,⁸⁰ Kuchma’s introduction of reforms for financial stabilization was quite successful as it significantly improved Ukraine’s economic state and attracted attention from the West, increasing Ukrainian trade with the west by 40% by 1995.⁸¹

Kuchma’s orientation in the Ukrainian nation and state-building process, along with his foreign policy direction, were extremely mixed and controversial during both terms of his presidency, although the one principle he had a strong position on was the preservation and recognition of Ukrainian independence.⁸² He dedicated his first four years in office to obtaining acknowledgement of Ukrainian sovereignty by the West and Russia, who finally officially

President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada. Attempt of Strengthening the Presidential Power (1994-2004),” 107.

⁷⁵Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” 432.

⁷⁶Кармазіна (Karmazina), “Демократи, соціалісти й ‘третя сила’ у боротьбі за владу (1991-1994 pp.) (Democrats, Socialists, and the ‘Third Force’ in the Struggle for Power (1991-1994)),” 56.

⁷⁷Mroz and Pavliuk, “Ukraine,” 56.

⁷⁸Kubicek, “Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine,” 435.

⁷⁹Mroz and Pavliuk, “Ukraine,” 54.

⁸⁰Aslund, “Left behind,” 108.

⁸¹Mroz and Pavliuk, “Ukraine,” 54.

⁸²Ibid.

recognized the Ukrainian state's borders between 1997 and 1999.⁸³ He also tried to better relations with the countries of Latin America, which Kuchma first visited in 1995.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, after Kuchma became President, the center-right politicians were preoccupied with his affirmative promotion of strengthening ties with Russia because they were scared that it would lead to the suspension of the nation-building process and to Ukraine's reintegration with Russia. Kuchma, on the other hand, took the middle position of establishing closer relationship with Russia and the CIS while defending Ukraine's independence and statehood, preventing the country's alienation from the West.⁸⁵

Kuchma's multi-dimensional orientation lay in his administration's intentions, its policies, and goals. Whilst having come into power on a pro-Russian platform, his first presidential term could be summarized as pro-Western oriented. During this period, Ukraine's engagement in the CIS remained exclusively economic-based,⁸⁶ while its pursuit of stronger cooperation with the West became more powerful. In June 1994, Ukraine signed a Partnership and Cooperation agreement (PCA) with the European Union, granting Ukraine most-favored nation status. This accomplishment was very significant due to the fact that this was the EU's first such agreement with a CIS state, but unfortunately, it contained no indication of potential membership unlike those signed with the Baltic and other Eastern European states.⁸⁷ In addition, Ukraine became a member of the CIS in June 1996, and, two years later, the invitation to attend the annual summit of Central European Presidents was offered to a Ukrainian President for the first time. Unfortunately, despite Kuchma's attempts to integrate into Central Europe and

⁸³Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine," 291.

⁸⁴Kuzio, "Ukraine and the Southern Hemisphere," 213.

⁸⁵Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other,'" 359.

⁸⁶Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 8–9.

⁸⁷Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," 258.

accentuate Ukraine's 'Central European' identity, the majority of states, except Poland, were not willing to recognize Ukraine as a Central European state either politically or culturally.⁸⁸

After Leonid Kuchma pointed out in 1997 the importance of focusing on Ukraine's financial independence once its territorial independence received worldwide acceptance,⁸⁹ the EU promised Ukraine consideration of the free-trade zone establishment in 1998, which depended upon the country's successful implementation of a market economy.⁹⁰ Ukraine was in need of international financial assistance after Kuchma launched his economic reforms. By improving its relationship with the United States since 1994 and after it signed the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (or START I Treaty) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), "Ukraine became the largest recipient of US aid" in the second half of the 1990s and signed a NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1997.⁹¹

Kuchma's 'European choice' during his first presidential term was successful in the promotion and development of Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism rather than the Eastern Slavic orientation he had promised in his presidential campaign. Ukraine's equivocal sentiment towards integration with the CIS, and its refusal to be a member of the CIS's Collective Security Treaty,⁹² could be considered as evidence of the pursuit of Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. Moreover, not only did Kuchma prioritize integration with Europe over cooperation with the CIS, he also often mentioned Ukraine's connection with and belonging to Europe through heritage, history, and culture. The adoption of the post-Soviet Constitution of June 1996, with the absence of any acknowledgment that ethnic Russians were on the same standing as the Ukrainian people in any

⁸⁸Ibid., 261–262.

⁸⁹Kuzio, "Ukraine and the Southern Hemisphere," 212.

⁹⁰Ibid., 258.

⁹¹Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 8-14.

⁹²Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," 41–42.

form only highlights Kuchma's rejection of the Eastern Slavic national identity.⁹³ And finally, by officially proclaiming its desire to become a member of the European Union in 1996,⁹⁴ Ukraine's nation-building took an Ethnic Ukrainian western orientation, but as it will be further seen, unfortunately, it was short lived and mere rhetoric.

By the time of the 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine, its democratization and marketization process was in decline.⁹⁵ Leonid Kuchma got reelected as Ukraine's President, this time on a pro-European platform, but his goals and actions for the next five years would significantly undermine Ukraine's westward orientation and its Ethnic Ukrainian identity. In fact, the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute would not even be allowed by the government to establish their offices in Ukraine.⁹⁶ In addition, Kuchma's loss of interest in marketization and privatization led to the development of an oligarchic Ukraine, which would result in Ukraine's economic performance becoming the worst of any post-communist state.⁹⁷ The newly established billionaires, who became oligarchs "by importing natural gas from Russia and foisting the bill on the government," explicitly sponsored Kuchma's second presidential campaign.⁹⁸ The efforts of a powerful central banker Victor Yushchenko, saved the economy from defaulting again as he worked to significantly reduce the inflation by 1997,⁹⁹ and after becoming a Primer Minister in 1999, continued to stabilize it. Nonetheless, the influence that the oligarchs had on Ukraine's development had not been

⁹³Ibid., 38.

⁹⁴Aslund, "Left behind," 114.

⁹⁵Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 16.

⁹⁶Aslund, "Left behind," 116.

⁹⁷Ibid., 108–109.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Dean, "Ukraine: Europe's Forgotten Economy," 101.

reduced, but only slightly weakened.¹⁰⁰ Kuchma's second presidential term would only worsen the Ukrainian political system and reinforce Ukraine's engagement with Russia and the CIS.¹⁰¹ Despite Kuchma's ambitious attempts to get the West to define Ukraine as a European country, a number of domestic issues were weakening Ukraine's picture internationally, which led to Western reluctance in pursuing international cooperation with Ukraine.

The Russian President at that time, Boris Yeltsin, had always seen Kuchma as an ally and regarded him as a reliable person to continue to maintain a strong Ukrainian-Russian relationship. While promoting Kuchma during his presidential election, Yeltsin stated: "[T]he first thing to do is not change the presidents, given that we have established friendly personal relations. If you change presidents, you may be in for a change of relations."¹⁰² That change of relations was one of the most essential decisions that Ukrainian powers should have fought for in order to develop democratically and achieve modernization in the long run. Due to the countless inabilities of the Ukrainian government and persistent Russian pressure, however, the idea of a European Ukraine was undermined.

The initial mixed management of a foreign policy that focused on the West but also kept friendship with Russia has been called the "To Europe together with Russia" policy.¹⁰³ Unlike during Kravchuk's era, when Ukraine was seen a "buffer" between Europe and Russia, Kuchma wanted to turn it into a "bridge" between the two.¹⁰⁴ Such a "multi-vector security policy" allowed the centrist oligarchs—the only group of Kuchma's domestic supporters—to openly operate their business with Russia, with little Western investment, causing the economy

¹⁰⁰Aslund, "Left behind," 108–109.

¹⁰¹Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 17.

¹⁰²Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," 254.

¹⁰³Shulman, "Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma," 41–42.

¹⁰⁴Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other,'" 360.

of Ukraine to be dependent on Russia.¹⁰⁵ As a result, Ukraine became the most oligarchic state of all the post-communist countries, with “nine oligarch factions now hold[ing] a slight majority among 450 parliamentary seats.”¹⁰⁶ With one problem leading to another, corruption became extremely widespread around the country, putting Ukraine at the 122nd position on a scale from least to most corrupt, out of 146 countries surveyed in 2004 by Transparency International.¹⁰⁷

The oligarchic rule and increasing corruption were not the only reasons Ukrainian relations with the European Union were not advancing. Throughout Kuchma’s second presidential term (1999-2004), there was a tremendous increase in conflicts among political elites which included violence and criminality. Some of the examples include the use of physical force and misconduct among politicians, media workers experiencing physical violence and sometimes death, and unexpected fatalities under suspicious circumstances of several political actors.¹⁰⁸ The Gongadze affair was the most famous and important scandal that occurred under Kuchma’s administration, and based on the available evidence, is considered to be organized by Kuchma himself. The editor of an independent news website, Hryhorii Gongadze, was found dead two months after his mysterious disappearance. There are numerous reasons to believe that Kuchma was directly involved in his kidnapping and murder, but the most obvious ones are that Gongadze had multiple critical publications on Kuchma’s regime, and then audio tapes were found which recorded Kuchma ordering his interior minister to kidnap Gongadze.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the level of distrust in political forces by the Ukrainian masses was extremely high in the post-Soviet period. Based on the poll conducted by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology, Shulman

¹⁰⁵Kuzio, “EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?,” 9.

¹⁰⁶Aslund, “Left behind,” 109.

¹⁰⁷Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” 36.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 69.

concludes that “[p]olitical parties, the president, parliament, and government (prime minister and cabinet) were all distrusted more than trusted for the ten years Kuchma was in power.”¹¹⁰

Kuchma’s regime has been characterized as contradictory, given that his policies generated both achievements and failures. The sphere of inter-ethnic relations and nationalism is one of his controversial policies.¹¹¹ Even though Kuchma stressed the development of Ethnic Ukrainian national identity, his actions in the second part of his presidency contradicted his alleged goals.¹¹² Subsequently, at the end of Kuchma’s presidential career the implementation and establishment of Ethnic Ukrainian national identity was not accomplished, although there were several notable successes during the process of its attempted realization. The linguistic Ukrainization of the educational system turned out to be progressive with 74% of students studying in Ukrainian as opposed to 25% studying in the Russian language in the early 2000s.¹¹³ Another factor that strengthened Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism was the continuous manifestation of Ukrainian historiography via the introduction of the Ukrainian currency, the hryvnya, and the adoption of the national anthem in 2003, the original lyrics of which were written by PavloChubynsky, a nationalist Ukrainian poet in the 19th century.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the level of salience of national identification was 65% in 2001, which was quite high for Ukraine, with respondents from the South having a higher score than those from the center.¹¹⁵ And lastly, according to the first December, 2001 census of the Ukrainian population since the Soviet one of 1989, there was a decline in the number of ethnic Russians from 22.1% to 17.3%, whereas the

¹¹⁰Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” 37.

¹¹¹Ibid., 32–33.

¹¹²Kuzio, “EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?,” 5.

¹¹³Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” 39–40.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 39.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 33.

ethnic Ukrainian population expanded from 72.7% to 77.8%.¹¹⁶ Therefore, Kuchma's Ukrainian nation-building process strengthened Ethnic Ukrainian national identity more in contrast to the Eastern Slavic, which also represents a Ukrainian sign of alienation from Russian identification, "particularly within the realm of education, historiography and myths."¹¹⁷

Looking at the shortcomings of Kuchma's pursuit of Ethnic Ukrainian national identity, however, opens up a broader picture of its overall failure. His mixed foreign policy tactic of balancing Ukraine's integration into Europe and its friendship with Russia¹¹⁸ did not help Ukraine in its identity development domestically or internationally. In turn, this orientation only intensified the EU's confusion¹¹⁹ and prolonged the development of decision-making processes towards cooperation with Ukraine. Kuzio explains their relationship as the adoption of virtual policies by both sides: "Ukraine keeps asking for a signal from the EU, to which the EU responds by saying Ukraine has to prove itself first."¹²⁰ Unfortunately, Ukraine under Kuchma, especially during his last years in power, did not establish a favorable reputation, and Ukraine's internal chaos only dissuaded Western attention. At a Warsaw conference in 2002, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) cautioned Ukrainian leaders that "Ukraine is not playing by the rules but playing with the rules."¹²¹ The failures to adequately democratize the political system of Ukraine and marketize its economy, in addition to the rise in corruption and inter-elite political violence, were the main sources of the Western world's hesitation and lack of support.¹²²

¹¹⁶Ibid., 42.

¹¹⁷Kuzio, "Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the 'Other,'" 360.

¹¹⁸Mroz and Pavliuk, "Ukraine," 57.

¹¹⁹Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 10.

¹²⁰Ibid., 11.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Shulman, "Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma," 41–42.

Furthermore, these flaws reinforced the already existing “large ethnic, linguistic, and regional fissures” within the Ukrainian population, which turned into more obstacles in the construction of a unified national identity.¹²³ As stated by Shulman, “[i]n a strong nation, national identity would ideally be of equal intensity across regions and ethnic groups. However, in Ukraine there are large regional and ethno-cultural differences in the national pride aspect of national identity.”¹²⁴ According to the 2001 data he presents on the level of national pride, 75% of the Western population of Ukraine were feeling proud to some degree, along with 57% of Southeastern respondents but only 30% in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This picture clearly represents regional differences, which also locates Ukraine to be the 13th out of the 14 post-communist states on the level of intensity of national pride, concluded by the European Value Survey of 2004.¹²⁵

Consequently, in 2003, by the end of President Kuchma’s rule, the growing authoritarianism of the oligarch’s regime made Kuchma so unpopular that his approval rating was around 7%.¹²⁶ In addition, from 1994 to 2004, there was a rise in the percentage of Ukrainian people that considered ‘organized crime and mafia’ to be the most powerful group in Ukrainian society, which is more than likely directly related to oligarchic behavior.¹²⁷ Kuchma’s weakness and the strength of his opposition were growing hand in hand.¹²⁸ The situation within the Ukrainian political sphere was divided between President Kuchma and his oligarchs and the national democrats of Our Ukraine party,¹²⁹ who were the strongest anti-authoritarian advocates

¹²³Ibid., 45.

¹²⁴Ibid., 33.

¹²⁵Ibid., 34.

¹²⁶Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 69.

¹²⁷Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine,” 288.

¹²⁸Aslund, “Left behind,” 113.

¹²⁹Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 69.

of Ukraine's democratization.¹³⁰ Prior to the 2004 presidential elections, many feared that the future of Ukraine was on the edge of turning into "another Belarus."¹³¹ Ukraine indeed was facing the real matter of life or death that was dependent on the choice of Ukrainians as it "could become a dictatorship or a fuller democracy."¹³²

Fortunately, the Ukrainian people did not let the fraud and corruption rule their lives, and they took to the streets, which led to the peaceful revolution in the name of democracy, called the Orange Revolution in 2004, making Viktor Yushchenko the next President of Ukraine. Kuzio's quotation of Greenfeld that, "revolutions are a modern form of political action: at their root always lies nationalism"¹³³ illustrates the most important factor of Ukraine's nationalism: the people, not the government, decided to stand for their country's desired democratic future. Notwithstanding the fact that Kuchma's regime had affected people's lives negatively in many ways, the population's support for independence of their country increased from 65% in Kuchma's first presidential term to 72% during his second term in office.¹³⁴ Compared to the data on Kuchma's public support, the conclusion could be made that the two factors did not affect each other. In other words, people supported their country's independence and put all of the other factors aside. On the contrary, various issues, such as the government's performance, did diminish the level of national pride among Ukrainians. Thus, the Orange Revolution, this first spark of hope for potential transformation into a more European Ukraine, bolstered the sentiment of Ethnic Ukrainian national identity within the population. Had Kuchma's handpicked successor Viktor Yanukovich won the 2004 elections, Ukraine could have been susceptible to

¹³⁰Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine," 290.

¹³¹Aslund, "Left behind," 107.

¹³²Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States," 69.

¹³³Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine," 286.

¹³⁴Shulman, "Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma," 35.

destruction in the form of corrupt authoritarian oligarchy regimes, but instead the protests salvaged Ukraine's international perception, which led to the return of respect for Ukraine from the Western states and their reevaluation of the presence of democratization in Ukrainian national identity.¹³⁵

¹³⁵Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine," 290.

CHAPTER 4

VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO (2004-2010)

The year 2004 was very significant in Ukraine's history because of the presidential elections that would determine the future of the nation – staying under the oligarchic authoritative regime, or entering into a world of democracy. The Orange Revolution determined Ukraine's democratic choice and put it on the path towards the West, but only temporarily. Later the Orange Revolution would be considered as the first spark of change in post-Soviet Ukraine and remembered as the unification of the Ukrainian population, a large majority of whom wanted change in the form of being a more European country. Nonetheless, the problems of the past still persisted and Ukraine's situation in the long run did not improve significantly in the political, economic, or social spheres, and even worsened in some of them.

Prior to the presidential elections stated for November, 2004, the situation within the Ukrainian political sphere was divided between President Kuchma and his oligarchs, and the national democrats of Our Ukraine party,¹³⁶ who were the strongest anti-authoritarian advocates and supporters of Ukraine's democratization.¹³⁷ Viktor Yushchenko's summary of the political state in 2002 is included in Aslund's paper:¹³⁸ "Ukraine has never been so close to an oligarchic system of power. We are witnessing the first stage of a *coup d'état* that started inside the walls of

¹³⁶Rachel Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine," *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2008): 69, <http://www.cceol.com/asp/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=871893ed9eee4771a614ad30be1330ef>.

¹³⁷Taras Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, no. 3 (September 2010): 290, doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2010.07.001.

¹³⁸Anders Aslund, "Left behind: Ukraine's Uncertain Transformation," *The National Interest*, 2003, 107, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42895646>.

parliament.” Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of Our Ukraine Party, and Viktor Yanukovich, Kuchma’s handpicked successor,¹³⁹ were the two main opposition candidates for the position of the President of Ukraine in 2004. The distinctions between the two politicians were obvious and could be seen in their presidential campaigns. The pro-Western Ukrainian-speaker Viktor Yushchenko has always been seen as a nationalist, promoting Ukraine’s Western integration and democratic modernization.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, Russian-speaking Viktor Yanukovich was a huge promoter of strengthening ties with Russia and criticized his opponent for being an “extreme anti-Russian nationalist and an American puppet”¹⁴¹ because of his political beliefs and Western-financed non-governmental support of Yushchenko’s campaign.¹⁴²

The high level of inter-elite conflict in Ukraine at that time resulted in animosity between the opposing parties and their supporters. Yanukovich’s campaign included advertisement of the renamed version of Yushchenko as ‘Bushchenko’ (Yushchenko + Bush), making a point that he was a ‘project of America’¹⁴³, in addition to calling Yushchenko’s supporters *nashisti* (“a term reminiscent of Natsisti – Nazis) due to the name of his party Our Ukraine or *NashaUkrainia*.¹⁴⁴ While the oligarch-controlled media portrayed Viktor Yanukovich in the best light possible, Yushchenko’s campaign stressed the criminal record of the former.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, there were some cases of violence used towards the candidates in order to eliminate them from the

¹³⁹Nadia Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (2014): 84, doi:10.1353/jod.2014.0041.

¹⁴⁰Stephen Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 5 (2005): 45, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10758216.2005.11052211>.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 70.

¹⁴⁴Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” 45.

¹⁴⁵Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 70.

competition, and with dioxin poisoning of Viktor Yushchenko that nearly killed him in September, 2004, as the most prominent one.¹⁴⁶

This strong division of the ruling ideas behind the two campaigns was also reflected in the distinct separation of regions of Ukraine, splitting it into the center and western ‘Orange Ukraine’ voting for Yushchenko, and the eastern and southern ‘Blue Ukraine’ voting for Yanukovich. As a result, 85% of the latter’s supporters were from the south-east and 80% of the former’s supporters were from the center and west of the country,¹⁴⁷ and strongly contrasted their choice of “honest, not corrupt Yushchenko” with the twice-criminal Yanukovich.¹⁴⁸

It is very important to mention that Yushchenko had been advocating for Ukraine’s integration into the EU since the very beginning when he was in government as a chairman of the Central Bank and later as a Prime Minister of Ukraine. He brought this opinion with him to the presidential elections before the Orange Revolution. Our Ukraine party members were afraid that Ukraine was going to be isolated or enter into an embrace with Russia.¹⁴⁹ The leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovich, was sponsored financially by Russia with an estimated amount of \$300 million for his campaign fund,¹⁵⁰ stated: “Russia was, is and will be for us a country tied to us by blood, history, religion and though spiritual values.”¹⁵¹ His attitude, intensified with an intentional electoral fraud, led to Ukrainians’ dissatisfaction with the election theft and the desire to speak up for their rights as democratic citizens, which would result in the first peaceful revolution in Ukraine – the Orange Revolution.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., 69.

¹⁴⁷Shulman, “Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma,” 45.

¹⁴⁸Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine,” 288.

¹⁴⁹Aslund, “Left behind,” 113.

¹⁵⁰Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 70.

¹⁵¹Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine,” 291.

With even the opposition being unsure until the last moment about the amount of support from the public,¹⁵² the protests started with the students and spilled over into between 50,000 and 150,000 Ukrainians.¹⁵³ This uprising resulted in Viktor Yushchenko securing the presidential victory and had significant results for Ukraine as a country domestically and internationally. Kuzio's statement that "[t]he Orange Revolution had combined nationalism and democracy"¹⁵⁴ could serve as a very brief but extremely meaningful summary of its main achievements. Given that Ukraine's national identification problem and inter-region division was one of the main issues of its nation-building since the beginning of its independence, the Orange Revolution monumentally boosted the image of the pro-Western Ethnic Ukrainian national identity of the Ukrainian population. If seen from the national identity perspective, Yanukovich and his Party of Regions was incorporated into the Eastern Slavic nationalism and Yushchenko and Our Ukraine party into the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism¹⁵⁵ because of their views on the future of Ukraine and its international direction. Thus, Viktor Yushchenko's victory emphasized the intensification of the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism not only politically but also socially because the key determinants were the people. This automatically leads to the categorization of the revolution as democratic because no one else but ordinary Ukrainians started the protests, which Diuk refers to as a "true popular uprising."¹⁵⁶ Even though there were multiple variations of the participants' reasons for standing on the Maidan in Kyiv, they all shared the feeling of anger at the politicians trying to steal their votes, as "they were perceived to have stolen their money and

¹⁵²Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 84.

¹⁵³Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine," 293.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 292.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., 286–291.

¹⁵⁶Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 83.

the country's assets in the previous decade.”¹⁵⁷ As a result, this willingness for justice and change for the better represented Ukraine's desire for transformation and was seen as a step in the progression of democracy in Ukraine.¹⁵⁸

In the international arena, the events of the presidential elections and the Orange Revolution raised attention from various actors, especially the United States, the European Union, and Russia, but their reactions differed. During Kuchma's presidency, the influence of the EU in Ukraine had been minimal both politically and economically, as mentioned in previous chapters. Nonetheless, Yushchenko's pro-European orientation and his promises to move directly towards achieving the goal of Ukraine's membership in the EU¹⁵⁹ impressed Europe and increased their pressure on Ukraine to democratize.¹⁶⁰ Even though it was beneficial for Yushchenko to put stress on the improvement of the Ukraine-EU relationship prior to the elections and during the protests, because it made his position more stable and popular than Yanukovich's,¹⁶¹ at the same time he did not just take advantage of the situation, but rather dedicated his term in office to strengthening ties with the West. Prior to the 2004 presidential elections, Kuzio outlined several possible situations that could be an outcome of them and considered Yushchenko's win to be the most favorable one for Ukraine. He noted: “A Yushchenko victory would radically change Ukraine's international image and move the country from virtual to real implementation of its ‘European choice,’” which would also push the

¹⁵⁷Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine,” 293.

¹⁵⁸Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 66–67.

¹⁵⁹Taras Kuzio, “EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?,” *The European Institute for Security Studies*, no. 47 (November 2003): 12, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ47.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰Vanderhill, “The EU and Non-Accession States,” 67.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, 70.

European Union for more cooperation with Ukraine.¹⁶² Theoretically he had a good point, but in reality, because of the disagreements among the European states on the level of influence in Ukraine and its prospects for membership, the EU's policy implementation was weak and vague.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, the EU's involvement in Ukraine did increase, especially during the Orange Revolution, mostly thanks to the willingness of Yushchenko and Our Ukraine party members to work closer with Europe.¹⁶⁴

This position of Yushchenko's did not seem beneficial for Russia, since all national democrats in its post-Soviet neighboring countries (such as Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia) were seen as 'anti-Russian'. Moscow was supporting Viktor Yanukovich's campaign because he was a pro-Russian centrist ally of Kuchma, and, thus, it would have been easy to cooperate with him and maintain Russia's control over Ukraine.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, Russia's authoritarian regime as implemented by its President Vladimir Putin was challenged by the Orange Revolution, which implied that post-Soviet Slavic countries could govern in a democratic way.¹⁶⁶ Viktor Yushchenko himself had never prioritized Russia while working in political and mainly economic spheres before running for the president. He in fact advocated for Russian business investments to "take place in a transparent way and face free competition with investment proposals from other nations."¹⁶⁷ Therefore, Yushchenko, in addition to being a Ukrainian nationalist and winning the elections with the support of the protests, was distrusted by

¹⁶²Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 6-12.

¹⁶³Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States," 67.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 71.

¹⁶⁵Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 13.

¹⁶⁶Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl, "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 3 (2009): 114, <http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora88&collection=journals&index=journals/fora&id=500>.

¹⁶⁷Aslund, "Left behind," 114.

the Kremlin, which tried to undermine him by using different methods. Russia mainly used its leverage over Ukraine's financial dependence on Russia due to its deep involvement in the previous decade, and highlighted economic disagreements between the two countries.¹⁶⁸

In the short term, the events of the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko becoming a President of Ukraine on a pro-Western platform with Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism were very successful and aspirational for both Ukraine and the West. For instance, during the elections in 2004, Freedom House ranked Ukraine as partly free with some low measures of democracy, while after the revolution Ukraine experienced a rise on the measures of democracy. In addition, in just two years, Freedom House ranked Ukraine higher in such spheres as electoral process, civil society, and independence of mass media.¹⁶⁹ The relations between Ukraine and the European Union also improved in the first couple of years: in 2005 Ukraine was granted a status of market economy by the EU and received some simplification in the visa regime process. Several other agreements point to the increased cooperation of the EU with Ukraine, although none of them mentioned potential membership for Ukraine. The policies and association agreements coming from the EU only "call[ed] upon Ukraine to consolidate democracy, strengthen the rule of law, and protect human rights," as outlined in the Ukraine-EU Action Plan that is part of the European Neighborhood Policy.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, given that Viktor Yushchenko's presidential term started off with enormous challenges left from the previous regimes that he had to face in order to "forge a stronger, more united, more Ukrainian nation-state,"¹⁷¹ it is worth

¹⁶⁸Karatnycky and Motyl, "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability," 106.

¹⁶⁹Oleksandr Stegnyy, "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27, no. 1 (March 2011): 55, doi:10.1080/13523279.2011.544383.

¹⁷⁰Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States," 68.

¹⁷¹Shulman, "Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma," 46.

noting that there were some noticeable achievements in respecting civil and political rights,¹⁷² such as expanding the freedom of press, and diminishing state interference in the economy.¹⁷³ In addition, his continuation of pursuing support from the EU¹⁷⁴ made him distinct from the typical post-Soviet Russian-oriented leaders.

Unfortunately, by the end of Yushchenko's term in office, five years after the success of the Orange Revolution, no one expected Ukraine to be experiencing the same state of instability as during the first years of its independence.¹⁷⁵ Despite President Yushchenko's enthusiasm to transform the country into a democratic modernized European state over a very short period of time, his reforms and their insufficient implementation, along with the lack of a well-planned course of actions by the opposition and civic groups, led to the breakdown of the process of governing.¹⁷⁶ Motyl and Karatnychy's analysis of Ukraine's situation in 2010 outline the numerous troubles and challenges it was facing back then.¹⁷⁷ To begin with, Ukraine was experiencing a high level of political instability due to institutional weakness that provoked conflicts over the power divisions between the president and the prime minister, who used to be close allies during the time of revolution. The already existent issue of finding a compromise between politicians intensified regional differences in Ukraine, mainly between the Russian-oriented east and south, and Western-oriented center and west of the country, as usual. Yushchenko did not manage to succeed in combating corruption and even lost power and influence over his own political party, Our Ukraine, which led one of the ministers in the

¹⁷²Paul Kubicek, "Reviewed Work: How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy by Anders Åslund," *Slavic Review* 69, no. 2 (2010): 472, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25677124>.

¹⁷³Karatnycky and Motyl, "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability," 110.

¹⁷⁴Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States," 70.

¹⁷⁵Karatnycky and Motyl, "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability," 107.

¹⁷⁶Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 85.

¹⁷⁷Karatnycky and Motyl, "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability," 107–114.

Parliament to say: “How can you manage a country when you can’t even manage your own party?”¹⁷⁸ Consequently, his public approval ratings went down significantly from exceeding 60% in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution to standing lower than 5% by the end of his presidential years.¹⁷⁹

Opinions and views on Ukraine differed and changed over time between the presidential elections of 2004 and 2010. For instance, George Soros firmly proclaimed back in 2004 that Ukraine was not ready to be part of the European Union and referred to its transformation to the modern state as unrealistic and impossible,¹⁸⁰ while Nadia Duik perceived the events of the Orange Revolution as the birth of a new Ukraine on the Maidan¹⁸¹ that had a potential to transform in a more democratic way.

In regards to the people of Ukraine, there were also several inconsistencies with the public’s opinions and social development during those years. People were divided regionally, by political choices, and by their self-identification, which connected to their national identity determination. Eastern Ukrainians who voted for pro-Russian leader Viktor Yanukovich preferred stability over change, with the latter being a choice of Western Ukrainians voting for pro-European Viktor Yushchenko in 2004 elections.¹⁸² These people who saw change as the necessary component for Ukraine’s future development were also the majority of protesters who stood on the Maidan Square advocating for the ‘Ukrainian’ Ukraine as opposed to the ‘Russian’

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 110.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 109.

¹⁸⁰Б. В. Зажигаєв(Zazhigaev), “Україна на перехресті глобальної політики. Частина 1: Україна та європейська система сучасних міжнародних відносин (Ukraine at the Crossroads of Global Politics. Part 1: Ukraine and the European System of International Relations),” *Проблеми міжнародних відносин*, 2010, 85, <http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/58744>.

¹⁸¹Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” 83.

¹⁸²Kuzio, “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine,” 289.

Ukraine.¹⁸³ This feature clearly emphasizes the rise in proportion of Ukrainian people holding an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity as opposed to the Eastern Slavic one. However, according to the 2004 survey, only 28% of the Ukrainian population perceived integration into the EU as a priority and one third identified themselves as European.¹⁸⁴ In consequence, these different identifications were both applicable to the Ukrainian idea of nationalism, and at the same time, had irregularities that made it difficult for the whole country to have a distinct national identity. This was one of the unsolvable issues since the 1990s and continues to be up until the present time.

In conclusion, by the end of Viktor Yushchenko's term in office, Ukraine's main problems remained the same as they were throughout the previous two decades, and consisted of the high level of the inter-elite conflicts and disagreements, issues of regional divisions, economic decline, and unstable foreign policy regulation. Motyl and Karatnycky noted that due to these weaknesses Ukraine "will probably continue to muddle through, more or less as it has been since 1991."¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, now the question was whether this way of existing as a state was enough to survive due to Russia's increased nondemocratic development and international influence, which it could use to target 'brittle' Ukraine through such areas as "energy, minority rights, and control over the Crimea."¹⁸⁶ Sadly enough, in about 10 years, this prediction would come true and Russia would take advantage of the complete turmoil in Ukraine, annex the Crimean Peninsula and invade Ukraine's eastern regions using the justification of the minority rights preservation.

¹⁸³Ibid., 292.

¹⁸⁴Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States," 71.

¹⁸⁵Karatnycky and Motyl, "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability," 113.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 113–114.

Viktor Yushchenko's contribution to Ukrainian history as a president could be viewed as invaluable regarding the strengthening of Ukrainian nationalism, the promotion of the Western democratic values, and the pursuit of Ukraine's integration into the European Union, along with the Orange Revolution, which was seen as the 'salvation' of Ukraine as a state and a nation. On the other hand, in a more practical rather than symbolic sense, Yushchenko and his administration was not able to achieve his goals due to various domestic and international factors, which led to some devastating consequences, not only at that time, but today where they still resonate.

CHAPTER 5

VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH (2010-2013)

Prior to the 2010 presidential elections, the situation in Ukraine was not politically or economically stable, given that the country's GDP fell by 15% in the year 2009¹⁸⁷ and the government was affected by the tensions and clashes between Viktor Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshenko, who were the two main candidates running for the presidency. Viktor Yushchenko lost his support and faded from the political picture by the end of his presidency, with hardly 5% of support in the first round¹⁸⁸ of the 2010 elections.

The tremendous success of the Orange Revolution at the time of its occurrence inspired hope for democratic reforms and Western integration, and the expectations for the future were raised domestically and internationally.¹⁸⁹ But in practice, their realization turned out to be difficult. The promised democratization of Ukraine and the reduction of corruption failed miserably¹⁹⁰ due to the internal political crisis of national identity, which was also the main reason for the regressed level of support from the West, especially the European Union.¹⁹¹ A number of issues proved that the process of Westernization is not simple and is only possible with strong internal structure and determination, which Yushchenko's government failed to demonstrate. Without Viktor Yushchenko in the picture, the tensions for the presidency were

¹⁸⁷Alexander J. Motyl, "Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich's Rise, Democracy's Fall," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2010): 125, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25680985>.

¹⁸⁸Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 85.

¹⁸⁹F. Stephen Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010): 38, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24384333>.

¹⁹⁰James Sherr, "Ukraine: Democratic Dangers," *The World Today* 66, no. 1 (2010): 26, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962437>.

¹⁹¹Stegniy, "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership," 62.

mainly between Viktor Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshenko, while the populations' perspective was to vote for anyone who could "fix the mess."¹⁹²

Yanukovich's campaign is worth mentioning because the results of his presidency would be completely different than the platform on which he was elected. Alexander Motyl notes that Viktor Yanukovich "presented himself as a moderate, democratic professional who could unify a country increasingly divided over whether it should align with Russia or the West."¹⁹³ In regards to foreign policy, he advocated for Ukraine serving as a bridge between the West and Russia and claimed that Ukraine could rise within the ranks of the world's twenty richest countries. In addition, Yanukovich openly stated the importance of the Orange Revolution in terms of democracy and accepted his missteps in the previous presidential election, giving the most obvious fake slogan to his campaign – "Ukraine for the people."¹⁹⁴ As a result, Yanukovich's wisely chosen approach to create a new positive picture for himself helped him win the elections. However, this victory against Yulia Tymoshenko was surprisingly narrow, only by a margin of barely 4%,¹⁹⁵ and in addition it was very unexpected,¹⁹⁶ given that it was because of the political fraud of Yanukovich that people took to the streets in 2004. Motyl suggested that Yulia Tymoshenko did not win because Viktor Yushchenko was encouraging his supporters to chose the "against all" option,¹⁹⁷ but this argument could not be completely proven because Ukrainians perceived her to be one of those politicians ruining the country. Moreover, there was

¹⁹²Motyl, "Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich's Rise, Democracy's Fall," 125.

¹⁹³Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵Scott Zhuge, "Political Prosecution: EU-Ukraine Relations in Turmoil," *Harvard International Review* 34, no. 2 (2012): 6, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42763512>.

¹⁹⁶Adam Meirowitz and Joshua A. Tucker, "People Power or a One-Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (2013): 478–479, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12017/full>.

¹⁹⁷Motyl, "Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich's Rise, Democracy's Fall," 126.

a joke that clearly represented the population's perception of these elections: "There is good and bad news: the good news is that Yulia Tymoshenko didn't become a president, the bad news is that Viktor Yanukovich did."¹⁹⁸

Contrary to his loud campaign promises, the minute Yanukovich received presidential status and power, his actions were in the opposite direction from being democratic and did not put the interests of the people above his own. Rather, he adopted the Eastern Slavic view on nation building. For example, one of his first strategies was to undermine the results of the Orange Revolution by bringing back the Constitution of 1996, which gave him more authority as a President, and by arresting such political figures as Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko, the revolution's activists.¹⁹⁹ Notwithstanding that Yanukovich's first international visit was to Brussels and the immediate introduction in February, 2010 of the cabinet of ministers' release of bulletins on the issues of European integration,²⁰⁰ the foreign policy direction of Yanukovich and the new administration took an obvious and almost exclusive pro-Russian orientation.²⁰¹

The amount of power given to Yanukovich was increasing and one of the factors contributing to it was the newly appointed political figures, mainly from "Ukraine's highly Sovietized rust belt"²⁰² and the president's homeland, the Donbass region. This aspect of Yanukovich's administration represents the corrupt and undemocratic side of it, as most of these ministers were former provincial leaders; meaning that they clearly lacked experience and skills in governing a country, especially on democratic terms.²⁰³ Also, Yanukovich's regime was

¹⁹⁸Meirowitz and Tucker, "People Power or a One-Shot Deal?," 482.

¹⁹⁹Orysia Lutsevych, "The Future Isn't Orange," *The World Today* 68, no. 4 (2012): 28.

²⁰⁰Stegniy, "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership," 67.

²⁰¹Rajan Menon and Alexander J. Motyl, "Counterrevolution in Kiev: Hope Fades for Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs*, 2011, 138, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23039635>.

²⁰²Motyl, "Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich's Rise, Democracy's Fall," 127.

²⁰³Menon and Motyl, "Counterrevolution in Kiev," 139.

tightly connected to the concept of cronyism since a network of his appointees to positions in various areas of Ukraine's governance were composed of Yanukovich's relatives and members of his inner circle,²⁰⁴ who would be found to own ridiculously enormous amounts of financial resources by the forced end of Yanukovich's career. Moreover, Yanukovich's government and his Party of Regions were in complete control of the country, turning previous reforms around and focusing on bringing Ukraine closer to Russia, with some deputies publicly suggesting state unification with some post-Soviet countries and the Russian Federation.²⁰⁵

There were also other actions and policies made under the rule of Yanukovich that can be considered as undermining democracy, the rule of law, and Ukrainization. One of them was President Yanukovich's basically illegal establishment of the parliamentary coalition called "Stability and Reform" in which he ignored Ukraine's Constitutional Court's prohibition against using individual deputies to form a coalition.²⁰⁶ Moreover, the main purpose for its formulation was to increase domestic political support for the President's administration and the government of the Prime Minister Mykola Azarov,²⁰⁷ a long-term ally of Yanukovich, in addition to emphasizing the importance of stability in Ukraine. The issue is how the notion of stability was understood by the government and the people. While Ukrainian people wanted stability in the country in terms of fluid function, the absence of stagnation, and equal treatment of individuals, Yanukovich and the ruling elites emphasized stability as that of Russia's or of Belarus,²⁰⁸ where there was no opposition from the public against the main authority.

²⁰⁴Katerina Malygina, "Ukraine as a Neo-Patrimonial State: Understanding Political Change in Ukraine in 2005-2010," *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe*, 2010, 14, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43293343>.

²⁰⁵Stegniy, "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership," 67.

²⁰⁶Motyl, "Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich's Rise, Democracy's Fall," 127.

²⁰⁷Kuzio, "Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine," 289.

²⁰⁸Ibid.

Consequently, in order to have no opponents to his regime, Yanukovich strategically eliminated his major political rivals, with the arrest and imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko as one of the most prominent examples. Given that the two political figures had a long history of continuous political frictions and diametrically opposed regional viewpoints, many actors considered Yanukovich's arrest of Tymoshenko to be intentional and power-motivated, denoting that in reality Tymoshenko's actions did not necessitate an arrest.²⁰⁹ Not only was this move of the Ukrainian government perceived negatively by the country's population, it also significantly strained Ukraine's relations with the Western community and worsened its international image. Both the European Union and the United States stated their dissatisfaction with the situation and expressed concerns over the treatment of Tymoshenko,²¹⁰ demanding her immediate release. Viktor Yanukovich put Ukraine's European assistance and integration at risk because the EU specified that the suppression of human rights and political oppression would result in no future collaboration with Ukraine.²¹¹

The only positive achievement seen from Viktor Yanukovich's actions was the unification of the Western society against his regime. But this also led Russia to claim it was "standing ready to rescue Ukraine."²¹² The Orange Revolution was perceived by Moscow to be more threatening to its autonomy and regional authority than the Georgian Rose Revolution,²¹³ but later during the 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia clearly showed that no limits would exist if Ukraine again slipped from its control.²¹⁴ Unfortunately, these signs proved to be true and

²⁰⁹Zhuge, "Political Prosecution: EU-Ukraine Relations in Turmoil," 6.

²¹⁰*Ibid.*, 6.

²¹¹Lutsevych, "The Future Isn't Orange," 28.

²¹²*Ibid.*

²¹³Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe," 38.

²¹⁴Gary D. Espinas, "Ukraine's Defense Engagement with the United States," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010): 59, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24384334>.

some predictions made by scholars and politicians on Russian undisputable interference in any moments of weakness in Ukraine came to be cruel reality a couple of years later.

After Yushchenko's moves that served to strengthen the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity, Yanukovich's presidency and the change of the country's priorities towards an Eastern Slavic direction of nationalism and state-building deepened the challenge of establishing democracy in Ukraine,²¹⁵ given that this transition proved to be difficult even under a pro-Western administration. Yanukovich's total disregard of Ethnic Ukrainian national identity was also represented in the anti-Ukrainian reforms and policies in various areas. For instance, Yanukovich appointed Dmytro Tabachnyk as a minister of education and science, who held a very negative view on Ukrainian identity, not even mentioning his weak academic pedigree. Many of his contributions to the educational system of Ukraine were criticized by the students themselves, who were protesting against Tabachnyk and Yanukovich's anti-Ukrainianism.²¹⁶

Subsequently, there were no noteworthy accomplishments of President Yanukovich and his government that benefitted the country as a whole in either the areas of politics, economics, or nationalism. Not only did his campaign turn out to rest on false promises, but his regime only intensified regional, political, and linguistic divisions in Ukraine. According to Menon and Motyl, "Yanukovich's most striking achievement has been to unite much of the country against him."²¹⁷ Even such neutrally-oriented politicians as the first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, were opposed to Yanukovich's government, which was demonstrated in an open letter to the latter, where Kravchuk wrote, "Your team has many people who want to continue along the path of lawlessness, permissiveness and corruption. They're developing a taste for

²¹⁵Зажигаєв (Zazhigaev), "Україна на перехресті глобальної політики. Частина 1," 83.

²¹⁶Motyl, "Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich's Rise, Democracy's Fall," 129.

²¹⁷Menon and Motyl, "Counterrevolution in Kiev," 139.

solving complex problems by force. This has nothing in common with democracy.”²¹⁸ Moreover, Lutsevych pointed out that on the international arena, “the Ukrainian leader has alienated his country’s key partners,”²¹⁹ as Ukraine’s corrupt domestic politics, along with Tymoshenko’s trial, were seen as anti-democratic and not corresponding to Western values.

And finally, the support of the Ukrainian population for the President and his government, although still regionally divided, decreased notably and gradually as Yanukovich’s regime became more authoritarian with time. In 2012, only two years in his presidency, 66% did not support Viktor Yanukovich, with only 16% in favor of his party.²²⁰ Individuals opposed to his regime declared their strong feeling of hostility towards Yanukovich as a political figure, which Motyl interpreted as the potential for an outbreak of “a second Orange Revolution.”²²¹ Furthermore, in regards to peoples’ attitude towards Ukraine’s foreign policy, as early as in 2011 the Razumkov center published a rise in the percentage of people believing that Ukraine is going in the wrong direction with 34% in 2010 and 63% in 2011.²²² This sentiment did not fade but has only gotten stronger. In 2012 Lutsevych points out that most ordinary citizens, including those from the east and the west combined, were aspiring for the European direction of the country.²²³ And lastly, the year 2013 determined with assurance the pro-European choice of Ukrainians as opposed to pro-Russian.

As much as studies of Ukraine and its democratic future did not see the country regressing to an authoritarian regime²²⁴ after the Orange Revolution, they also turned out to be

²¹⁸Motyl, “Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich’s Rise, Democracy’s Fall,” 135.

²¹⁹Lutsevych, “The Future Isn’t Orange,” 28.

²²⁰Ibid.

²²¹Motyl, “Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovich’s Rise, Democracy’s Fall,” 133.

²²²Menon and Motyl, “Counterrevolution in Kiev,” 142.

²²³Lutsevych, “The Future Isn’t Orange.”

²²⁴Malygina, “Ukraine as a Neo-Patrimonial State,” 9.

skeptical of Ukrainians taking to the streets again to protect their European future. This is because growing Euroscepticism was seen in the public in the beginning years of Yanukovich's presidency with its origin in the constant inability of the government to implement democratic reforms and the EU's vagueness to confirm or even consider Ukraine's potential membership.²²⁵ Another unpromising factor was a great level of reluctance of the population to protest just about half a year prior to the events of winter 2013.²²⁶ Nonetheless, Ukrainians would take their future in their own hands once again and demonstrate resistance and opposition towards Yanukovich's rule, proving their political consciousness and defending the desired direction of their country's development.

²²⁵Stegniy, "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership," 67.

²²⁶Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 85.

CHAPTER 6

EUROMAIDAN AND THE PRESENT DAY

The inadequacy of Viktor Yanukovich's presidency and the negative impact it had on Ukraine and its citizens led to the biggest uprising in the history of independent Ukraine – the Revolution of Dignity, also referred to as EuroMaidan. This event is considered the rebirth of a truly Ukrainian nationalism and identity, in addition to the firm determination of Ukraine's desired way of development – European, thus underlying the prevalence of the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism over the Eastern Slavic one.

Initially, the one and only reason for the beginning of the protests of Ukrainians was the refusal of President Yanukovich to sign the Associate Membership Agreement on Political Association and the Free Trade Pact with the European Union, which was of utmost importance for Ukraine in several aspects. Looking at the history of Ukraine's relationship with the EU since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this agreement held a significant political, economic, and social meaning. As a result, the last minute decision not to sign it had very serious and unexpected consequences for the people of Ukraine and its government, and the world in general. The externalities of the Ukrainian Revolution of 2013 had a geopolitical impact involving the increased attention of multiple international actors such as Russia, the European Union, and the United States. This uprising and the following events “transformed the world” and became the center of Slavic studies at the time, which began to focus on the questions of national identity, democracy, and the transformation of Ukraine.²²⁷

²²⁷Timothy Snyder, “Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World,” *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 695, doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.695.

The analysis of the Revolution itself is important because its causes, dynamics, and outcomes have very powerful implications for Ukraine as a post-Soviet state desiring to operate as a modern European one. The first protesters arriving in Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) were students and young people (mostly those who were familiar with the European values and Western system of governance²²⁸) expressing their dissatisfaction with the actions of government officials who were perceived to be taking away the possibility of a European future.²²⁹ One of the noteworthy features of this revolution, stated by Diuk, is that it is distinct from a number of the so-called ‘color revolutions’ for the reason that the initial movement was not *against* a regime or an idea, its purpose was *for* an idea of a European Ukraine and its future.²³⁰ The speed of the revolution was surprising to the whole world, including the Ukrainian population,²³¹ an unpredictably big part of which participated in the demonstrations and included citizens from all over the country.²³²

In addition, as opposed to the bloodless Orange Revolution of 2004, this one started peacefully but resulted in human deaths due to the use of military force organized by Yanukovich’s administration. For the first time in the political protests of post-Soviet Ukraine, people were killed in the heart of the country, opening a new violent page in the history of

²²⁸Nadia Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (2014): 85, doi:10.1353/jod.2014.0041.; George Soros, “A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine,” *The New York Review of Books*, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/02/05/new-policy-rescue-ukraine/>;

²²⁹Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” 85.

²³⁰*Ibid.*, 86.

²³¹Eugene Rumer and Paul Stronski, “Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at Twenty-Five—A Baseline Assessment,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, December 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/10/russia-ukraine-and-eurasia-at-twenty-five-baseline-assessment/imsv?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRouvq7MZKXonjHpfsX54u0kXqKg38431UFwdcjKPMjr1YsDRcB0aPyQAgobGp5I5FEIQ7XYTLB2t60MWA%3D%3D.

²³²Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” 87.

sovereign Ukraine.²³³ The events quickly escalated; within a couple of months Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula, resulting in the outbreak of a war on the Eastern borders of Ukraine,²³⁴ which is taking away many lives every day.²³⁵

The Revolution of Dignity changed Ukraine and its people;²³⁶ the country was becoming stronger spiritually while getting destroyed politically and economically by the Russian aggression. The unification of Ukrainians on the shared interests and outlooks for the future of their country was one of the reasons Ukraine stood up to Russia and stayed strong during the time of social and political turmoil, which is considered to be the best period for the examination of the Ukrainian national idea.²³⁷ People risked their lives on Maidan for the democratic European future,²³⁸ the rule of law, and humanitarian values, which deepened many scholars' and international actors' ²³⁹ understanding and analysis of the Ukrainian social complexity. Portnov suggests that Ukraine's situation should be examined with nuances²⁴⁰ and with the fact in mind that Ukraine is a unique case of a post-Soviet development of nation-building and thus cannot be fully applied to any established framework.

²³³Andrii Portnov, "Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies," *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 726, doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.723.

²³⁴Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, "The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism," *Review of Central and East European Law* 39, no. 3–4 (November 18, 2014): 214, doi:10.1163/15730352-00000019.

²³⁵Snyder, "Integration and Disintegration," 704.

²³⁶Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 83.

²³⁷А. І. Лукашенко (Lukashenko),

"Проблема української самоідентифікації в межах світових інтеграційних процесів (The Problem of Ukrainian Identity within the Global Integration Processes),"

Проблеми міжнародних відносин, 2010, 219,

<http://dspace.nbuv.gov.ua/handle/123456789/58857>.

²³⁸Soros, "A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine."

²³⁹Snyder, "Integration and Disintegration," 695.

²⁴⁰Portnov, "Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies," 730–731.

The social unity of Ukrainians and their support of the European future of Ukraine was demonstrated not only through the protests on Maidan, but also through the interconnectedness of people within the country and their actions. For example, some people did not directly participate in the revolution, but provided volunteer financial, humanitarian, and moral support by donating blood, cooking, providing essentials, etc.²⁴¹ Moreover, on the very streets of Maidan there was a feeling of connectedness; it “helped to build bonds of trust among people,”²⁴² and the atmosphere had a unique character, which only those who lived through the Maidan experience could fully understand.

Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the warm and peaceful sentiment was destroyed by the political actions of Yanukovich’s administration followed by the Kremlin’s responses. There were numerous predictions in the scholarly articles that outlined Russia’s responses to Ukraine’s smallest signs of instability after the Orange Revolution, the realization of the worst ones occurred in the spring of 2014. After Vladimir Putin’s intentions to instantly destroy Ukraine with the Crimean takeover failed, “Russia backed separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts”²⁴³ which are parts of the predominantly Russian-speaking industrialized region of Donbass.²⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the biggest irony of these events is that they worked against Putin’s purposes and instead had positive implications for Ukraine in terms of strengthening the public idea of European integration as opposed to developing as part of Russia.²⁴⁵ This enhanced a sense of national solidarity within Ukrainians,²⁴⁶ and resulted in the new pro-European government in

²⁴¹Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” 86.

²⁴²Ibid., 88.

²⁴³Snyder, “Integration and Disintegration,” 704.

²⁴⁴Portnov, “Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies,” 726.

²⁴⁵Snyder, “Integration and Disintegration,” 704.

²⁴⁶Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” 88.

power through fair and free elections.²⁴⁷ The current President of Ukraine, “billionaire chocolate manufacturer” Petro Poroshenko, won the presidential elections of May 2014 with 54.7% in the first round²⁴⁸ on the platform of promises to Europeanize Ukraine, stop the war, and fight corruption, none of which are close to fruition, two years into his governance.

Because of the weaknesses of political governance in Ukraine, a problem that has been passed on through various presidencies since 1991, the country is facing a number of domestic obstacles that are also connected to some international factors. A couple of the most well-known and everlasting issues within Ukraine are the existence of the oligarchy and severe corruption, conflict with Russia,²⁴⁹ political instability²⁵⁰ that creates ineffectiveness²⁵¹ in the implementation of democratic reform and the improvement of economic crisis. Ukraine has a lot to undertake in order to become a functional democratic state ready to be integrated into Europe, on which George Soros comments that the old Ukraine is still present in various spheres of its life, but there was indeed a birth of a new Ukraine that is being driven by the strong Euro-oriented civil society.²⁵² Consequently, he argues, it is extremely important for the international community, the European Union specifically, to take actions in showing support and exerting influence in assisting reform and transformation of weak or corrupt areas in Ukraine, as “the magnitude of European support and the reforming zeal of the new Ukraine are mutually self-

²⁴⁷Eugene Rumer Stronski Paul and Eugene Rumer, “Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at Twenty-Five—A Baseline Assessment,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, accessed May 2, 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/14/russia-ukraine-and-eurasia-at-twenty-five-baseline-assessment/imsv>.

²⁴⁸Diuk, “Finding Ukraine,” 88.

²⁴⁹Stronski and Rumer, “Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at Twenty-Five—A Baseline Assessment.”

²⁵⁰В. М. Наконечний (Nakonechnyi), “Україна в глобалізаційних та інтеграційних процесах (Ukraine in the Globalization and Innovation Processes),” *Проблеми міжнародних відносин: [зб. наук. праць/наук. ред. Канцелярук Бі та ін.]*.—К.: КіМУ, 2010, 257, <http://www.kyumu.edu.ua/vmv/v/p01/18%20nakonechniy.pdf>.

²⁵¹Soros, “A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine.”

²⁵²Ibid.

reinforcing.” This, in turn, would only secure and tighten the sentiment of pro-Europeanism within the population of Ukraine that has been more politically engaged and conscious about the future of their country.

The history of the relationship between the European Union and Ukraine gives a better understanding of Ukraine’s stagnated process towards European integration and Western development, and the reasons for this stagnation are a result of both sides. Ukraine expressed its willingness to become a member of the European Union in the early 1990s, but criticized various aspects of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement it was given, including its four year late implementation, then complained about the lack of coordination in the Common Strategy between the two sides, and finally, demanded concrete steps from the EU as a response to the democratic changes in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution.²⁵³ A number of positive responses from the European side could be noted, including their addition of a few clauses and a free-trade area prospect to the Ukrainian PCA that were absent in such agreements with other post-Soviet states, increased their support for Ukraine’s European aspirations during the 2004 democratic movement, and finally renamed the accord to be an Association Agreement.²⁵⁴ Despite the above-mentioned positive features of the EU-Ukraine relationship, the level of cooperation was never enough to be stable and effective in order to reach the desired outcome for Ukraine – becoming part of the European Union.

Looking at the Ukrainian side, the most notable reasons for its delayed progress in the European integration lay in the political and economic inability of the country and its weak government to implement new reforms and satisfy the criteria for accession given by the EU. In

²⁵³Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism,” 215–220.

²⁵⁴Ibid.

addition, Ukraine's geopolitical position and at times questionable foreign policy decisions inclined towards more cooperation with Russia reinforced the Union's sentiment of reluctance and lack of influence in Ukraine. Therefore, the EU has rejected many of Ukraine's proposals for increased cooperation through more comprehensive binding agreements in order to secure the membership perspective,²⁵⁵ which has never been officially offered nor mentioned by the EU.²⁵⁶ As a result, the fulfillment criteria in the EU-Ukraine agreements throughout many years has been vague and consisted of a low level of commitment, oftentimes because of some member states' lack of interest in Ukraine's accession, or due to their unwillingness to get into a confrontation with Russia.

The list of reasons for the slow and stagnant relationship between Ukraine and the European Union is very long and each side could be blamed for today's outcome, but it is never too late if the desire is still present. Ukraine has clearly demonstrated and proved its commitment to the EU: for example, the outbreak of the revolution was for the European future, and "the postrevolutionary government of Ukraine implemented many substantial reforms"²⁵⁷ directed at the improvement of democracy, the rule of law, and European values in the country. Moreover, Petro Poroshenko signed the political part of the Association Agreement during the most serious acts of Russian aggression in March 2014, and the economic part in June of that year, underlying the importance of it and reestablishing Ukraine's European standpoint and commitment.

²⁵⁵Ibid., 217–220.

²⁵⁶Rachel Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine," *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2008): 67, <http://www.cceol.com/aspx/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=871893ed9eee4771a614ad30be1330ef>.

²⁵⁷Stronski and Rumer, "Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at Twenty-Five—A Baseline Assessment."

However, the core of the agreement did not change,²⁵⁸ there was no mention of firm membership potential, and no specification of the timing for the criteria to be fulfilled.

Europe has been criticized for its limited assistance and influence in the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine mainly because, it is argued, that the EU is abandoning its essential values and principles.²⁵⁹ A very famous French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy during his visit to Kyiv a year after the Maidan revolution made a couple of interesting points on the idea of Europe in regards to Ukraine's existing situation, where he referred to current Europe as a *hotel* rather than a *house*, stating: "Europe that left behind Bosnia and is now leaving Ukraine – is not a house, it is a hotel." After calling Europe disappointing and draining, Lévy argued that the acceptance of Ukraine with its new blood and new cells of European-ness could help recover the aging European body.²⁶⁰ International critics also point at the minimum amount of Western financial assistance given to Ukraine and the inefficient volume of economic sanctions against Russia as these measures have not been proven to be effective. According to George Soros, the reason that only economic sanctions are used against Russia is that "neither the EU nor the US is willing to risk war with Russia."²⁶¹

As a consequence, the overall picture of Ukraine's salvation is doomed into a circle of countless domestic and international factors in all the possible areas of political, economic, and social spheres. Nonetheless, Ukraine has started on a path toward Europeanization via the social dimension. In other words, the people of Ukraine and their unification in the Ethnic Ukrainian

²⁵⁸Dragneva and Wolczuk, "The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism," 232–233.

²⁵⁹Soros, "A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine."

²⁶⁰"Бернар Анрі-Леві: Україна носить ідею Європи (Bernard-HenriLévy: UkraineCarriestheIdeaoofEurope)," *Громадське радіо*, February 20, 2015, <http://hromadskeradio.org/programs/intervyu/bernar-anri-levi-ukrayina-nosyt-ideyu-yevropy>.

²⁶¹Soros, "A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine."

principles of national identity brought the country back on its European track and are going to be the major driving force behind further economic and political democratic transformation. Ukrainian diplomat and head deputy of the Presidential Administration, Kostiantyn Yeliseiev, outlines “the simple reality” of Ukraine’s European integration: “With successful reforms – Ukraine will be successful. With successful Ukraine – there will be integration into the EU.”²⁶² Another Ukrainian scholar, Nakonechnyi, stated that the European integration should not be only connected to the EU membership, instead it is the “key modernizational and transformational idea of Ukrainian society.”²⁶³ These statements only enhance the point that Ukrainian conscious political, academic, and civil society has a clear understanding of the principle of the European integration and realizes the number of changes that need to be done until we enter into the western way of state functioning.

This argument is also supported in a survey that I undertook for the purpose of this paper in regards to the attitude of Ukrainians towards their country becoming European. The method that I used was to enlist family and friends to pass out my questionnaire to their acquaintances, which brought me to the analysis of fifty complete surveys. For the reason that around 95% of the total 50 respondents were of Ukrainian origin and lived in Kyiv, this survey is not considered to represent the diversity of opinions throughout the whole country, given that the sample is not random. Nevertheless, the results turned out to be rather unexpected an enlightening regarding the aim of my study. Different aspects were taken into consideration while determining the general direction of nationalism within the group of respondents (pro-Russian or Eastern Slavic

²⁶²Костянтин Єлісеєв (Yeliseev), “Україна–ЄС: що день прийдешній нам готує,” *Національна безпека і оборона*, no. 1 (2009): 6, http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD105_ukr_3.pdf.

²⁶³Наконечний (Nakonechnyi), “Україна в глобалізаційних та інтеграційних процесах (Ukraine in the Globalization and Innovation Processes),” 257.

national identity versus pro-European Ethnic Ukrainian one), which included age, occupation, perception of various current domestic challenges, and their opinions on the level of Europeanness of Ukraine and whether or not it has the ability to become a European state. Most questions required open-ended responses, but a couple were yes/no responses.

To begin with, the general idea that only the younger population in Ukraine has a strong sense of national identity and wants Ukraine to be European failed to be demonstrated for the reason that the age of my respondents varied from 18 to 78 years with a large majority of pro-European responses given by the group. These findings were surprising to me because pensioners in Ukraine do not have a stable social security system, nor are they well-protected by the government, and, thus, a lot of supporters of the former pro-Russian leaders were people of older age that wanted stability over change. With time, however, the notions of European values have become more widespread within Ukraine which changes the perspective of a lot of Ukrainians, and not only the younger people.

Moreover, the respondents' occupations were very diverse, including students and retired people, social and humanitarian workers, lawyers, managers, construction workers, and military men. People of different social and economic statuses in Ukraine oftentimes have very opposed opinions on politics. However, this sample of people unexpectedly agreed on numerous aspects of the way they see Ukraine and its future. For instance, a large majority of people surveyed shared the opinions in identifying the obstacles that prevent Ukraine from Europeanization, which in order of importance consisted of the lack of reasonable governance and the rule of law, severe level of corruption, the lack of protection of human rights, and poor standards of social security and the economic protection of individuals.

In terms of national identification and the choice between pro-Europe versus pro-Russian, 95% of respondents said they identify themselves to be pro-European and consider Ukraine to be a European country, although some mentioned that they believed this to be true only as a matter of geography and territory for the reason that Ukraine lacks a number of European principles in its performance as a sovereign state. Consequently, the respondents shared an opinion that Ukraine is not going to operate as a European country any time soon for a range of political and economic reasons. These reasons included the dismal performance of the current government and the feeling that the ongoing conflict is going to stand in the way of Ukraine's path to Europe.

One of the small but very relevant findings I saw in my survey is that only one out of the fifty respondents filled out the questionnaire in the Russian language while still answering the questions in a pro-European voice. The survey was created in two languages – Ukrainian and English – for the reason that Ukrainian is an official national language of the country and English because my thesis work is performed in this language. Even though I did not put any constraints on the way/manner the survey should be filled out, this outcome represents that the level of 'Ukrainization' could be considered to be high as opposed to the beginning years of Ukrainian independence (I.e. the populous' knowledge of the Ukrainian language).

Another very interesting result is the attitude of Ukrainians towards the eastern regions of Ukraine that are under Russian control – the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. Territorial integrity is one of the principal features of a state's democratic prosperity and unity, though even those who strongly supported Western values had distinct ideas on the potential political and territorial separation of the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics. Some claimed that it is unfair to the Ukrainian population to have to deal with Russian separatists that undermine the unity of the country, while others simply asked whether the question was rhetorical because

separation is not even an option, as they claimed. The number of such controversial topics is countless in Ukraine, so are the opinions of the population itself. However, what is clear in the responses of the ordinary and more sufficient Ukrainians is the aspiration for the Ukrainian unity towards Europe, not Russia, and thus the predominance of the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism over the Eastern Slavic one.

Former President Yanukovych's actions combined with the threats and challenges from the Russian side contributed to the social transformation of Ukrainians, their sense of identity, and aspirations for the future,²⁶⁴ creating a new Ukraine that is seeking to be distinct from Russia,²⁶⁵ and evolve into a modern democratic European state. The oft-heard phrase that Nadia Diuk used to sum up the events of winter 2013-spring 2014 demonstrates this change of the Ukrainian nation: "We came to the Maidan for Europe, but instead we found Ukraine."²⁶⁶ This Ukraine is going to be European with the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism driving the population of Ukraine, which in turn, will do anything, as witnessed by the whole world, to fight for the better life and better future for the next generations to come.

²⁶⁴Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 89.

²⁶⁵Soros, "A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine."

²⁶⁶Diuk, "Finding Ukraine," 89.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This upcoming August, 2016, Ukraine will be celebrating its 25th year of independence from the former Soviet Union (as well as a variety of other governing systems it has been a part of for the majority of its existence). Ukraine's long absence on the international political map as a sovereign state was one of the reasons it has been generally examined in the context of the foreign policy of states it belonged to,²⁶⁷ and it was seen as a “by-product of imperial politics.”²⁶⁸ Therefore, the analysis of Ukraine as a state and as a nation requires a more detailed examination of various aspects of its development, the interconnectedness of political, economic, and social spheres, and a consideration of the unexpected events that transform every part of Ukraine in one way or another.

In this work, I examined the political regime of every Ukrainian president since 1991, with a focus on the topic of Ukrainian nationalism and the issue of national identification within the diverse and regionally divided Ukrainian population. Because Ukraine is in the middle of two powerful international players, the Russian Federation and the European Union, its direction of development is and always been influenced by its geopolitical location. The question has always been where would Ukraine turn – to Russia or Europe? Based on my analysis, these factors also impacted the orientation of the national idea in Ukraine, mainly determined by the type of government in power. I identified the two most prominent identities in Ukraine – pro-European

²⁶⁷В. М. Наконечний (Nakonechnyi), “Україна в глобалізаційних та інтеграційних процесах (Ukraine in the Globalization and Innovation Processes),” *Проблеми міжнародних відносин: [зб. наук. праць/наук. ред. Канцелярук Бі та ін.]*.–К.: КіМУ, 2010, 248, <http://www.kytmu.edu.ua/vmv/v/p01/18%20nakonechniy.pdf>.

²⁶⁸Andrii Portnov, “Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies,” *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 723, doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.723.

Ethnic Ukrainian and Pro-Russian *Eastern Slavic*, which are outlined in the academic works of TarasKuzio and Stephen Shulman. Before I proceed to the consolidation of the main argument of my work, I will demonstrate how the domestic ruling elites and the international actors' involvement in Ukraine's foreign policy vector influenced the notion of nationalism in Ukraine before the social transformation of the Ukrainian society occurred through the two revolutions in 2004 and 2013.

In the 1990s, Ukraine's political and economic weaknesses became apparent due to the structure of the Soviet economy. The highly integrated nature of the Soviet economy left Ukraine –as with all of the former Soviet republics– highly vulnerable to severe economic shocks and ill placed to establish an independent economy.²⁶⁹ Scott Radnitz further explains that in many of these states, including Ukraine, corrupt privatization practices greatly benefited the regime elites who controlled Ukraine's economy. Because the Ukrainian government also lacked the necessary experience needed to democratically govern a country, the relationship between “economic dispersion and inter-elite conflict in postcommunism”²⁷⁰ has persisted through each successive government leading up to the present day.

The first President Leonid Kravchuk's (1991-1994) focus in terms of Ukraine's nation-building was intended to be toward Europe. His aspirations were promoting an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity in the country and distancing Ukraine from being identified as part of Russia. Nevertheless, due to the major internal constraints between the democratic and Soviet-minded politicians, legal inconsistencies, and a lack of attention from the European Union, the country could not begin its process of efficient democratic development and got stuck for a very long

²⁶⁹Scott Radnitz, “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet ‘revolutions,’” *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 2 (2010): 131,

<http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2010/00000042/00000002/art00001>.

²⁷⁰Ibid.

time with the problem of corruption, the lack of fair implementation of the rule of law, and the absence of order. Starting at this time, multiple scholars of political thought identified and emphasized the positive influence international assistance would have on Ukrainian Western-oriented state- and nation-building processes. Such assistance would only benefit Ukraine and keep stability and security on the international arena.

Kravchuck's successor, President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004), was characterized by his multi-vector foreign policy tactic trying to establish friendly relationships with both Russia and Europe, while in actuality his two presidential terms inevitably manifested a pro-Russian orientation. Kuchma intended to focus on the improvement of the economic situation in Ukraine, but instead intensified a system of oligarchy in Ukraine that gained control over the country's economy by the end of his term. The failures of President Kuchma's regime resulted in the decrease of already insufficient support from the West and only intensified their confusion and hesitance on a more comprehensive cooperation between Ukraine and the EU. While Kuchma achieved some improvements in strengthening the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity through the 'Ukrainization' of the country's educational and historiographical areas, as well as finally receiving international recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty, Kuchma's involvement in cases of political violence and his actions towards building close connections with Russia, only undermined the abovementioned attempts at nation-building processes. Leonid Kuchma's presidency ended with a very high level of distrust in the political forces by Ukrainians, a rapid rise in corruption, and a faded Western influence and interest in just another "semi-Russian" country,²⁷¹ as it was seen from the outside.

²⁷¹Taras Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," *The European Institute for Security Studies*, no. 47 (November 2003): 6, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ47.pdf>.

The Orange Revolution of 2004, which led to the victory of a pro-Western leader Viktor Yushchenko (2004-2010), had an enormous impact on the image of Ukraine not only globally, but also domestically. The electoral fraud of the Party of Regions led by Viktor Yanukovich had a profound influence on Ukrainian society. Ordinary Ukrainians took to the streets to defend their votes and to call for truly democratic elections and fair government. This move was one of the first ones taken by the Ukrainian people on the principles of the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism because the core purposes for the political revolutionary movement lay in the ideas of liberal democracy and reforms, Western values, and further development towards Europe, not Russia. The Orange Revolution gave hope to the Western-oriented Ukrainian population regarding the potential to transform into a more democratic society. This event also attracted international attention, including an increased influence of the European Union in Ukraine, although only temporarily. Unfortunately, due to the political weakness of the governing elites and the absence of a unified development plan for the country, Ukraine stagnated in its Western development and ended up with the election of the Eastern Slavic-inclined Viktor Yanukovich in 2010. Therefore, it is important to note that even with a moderate level of a widely shared sentiment of nationalism and international involvement, it is crucial for Ukraine to have a stable, strong, and unified government, the factor that was clearly lacking in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution.

Viktor Yanukovich (2010-2013) was elected on a pro-Western platform as his campaign focused on the promotion of European integration and the democratic development of Ukraine, but the minute he won the presidential elections, he tried to undermine all the positive achievements of the former pro-European administration: he returned to the pre-revolutionary Constitution, gave himself more presidential power, and oriented Ukraine's foreign policy to be

structured similar to Kuchma's 'multi-vector' one, meaning balancing between Russia and Europe. In reality, all his actions and decisions while in power were directed towards Russia and there were no concrete steps taken to improve a comprehensive relationship with the European Union to secure Ukraine's potential accession.

As a result, Yanukovich's presidential term ended sooner than it was supposed to for a range of reasons. However, the most significant one was the dissatisfaction of Ukrainians having their European future being stolen, because President Yanukovich did not sign the Associate Membership Agreement on the Political Association and Free Trade Pact with the European Union. The importance of taking a step further in cooperation with the EU was taken very seriously by Ukrainian citizens because, in their eyes, it meant the stabilization of the rule of law in Ukraine,²⁷² which is considered to be one of the principal flaws of the governing system of the country. During this time, Ethnic Ukrainian Nationalism was much more prominent among Ukrainian citizens due to the fact that they were actually risking and giving their lives for a European future, even during the rapid escalation of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the war on the Eastern borders of Ukraine.

These events are being blamed on the Western policymakers because of their prolonged status quo position in Ukraine,²⁷³ which I also consider to be a big part of the reason for Ukraine's current crisis. Apart from the domestic inability of the country to implement some of the EU's reforms due to its unstable state, the European Union has not made any commitments in regard to Ukrainian membership, nor put a lot of effort into strengthening ties with Ukraine over

²⁷²Timothy Snyder, "Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World," *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 703, doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.695.

²⁷³Eugene Rumer Stronski Paul and Eugene Rumer, "Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at Twenty-Five—A Baseline Assessment," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, accessed May 2, 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/14/russia-ukraine-and-eurasia-at-twenty-five-baseline-assessment/imsv>.

the past two decades²⁷⁴ even though integration into the European Union has been Ukraine's long-standing priority²⁷⁵ notwithstanding some anti-democratic political regimes throughout its independent history. There are several indications of Ukraine having high levels of willingness to Europeanize the country and its people: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, unlike other CIS countries, had a peaceful transition of presidential power and a solid record of national minorities' treatment;²⁷⁶ the Ukrainian response to EU reform has always been more positive than any other non-accession state's;²⁷⁷ and Ukraine was the only non-accession state that has been showing their eagerness to start making changes in order to join the EU²⁷⁸ even before the Revolution of 2004.

Therefore, taking into account the aforementioned statements, and taking into account the EuroMaidan Revolution of 2013, there is enough evidence to state that Ukraine has done more to show its strong cooperation and willingness to present its interest in entering the EU, than the EU has done to increase its pressure and support to help and guide Ukraine in this difficult process. The European Union's limited pressure on the encouragement of Ukraine's reform implementation was primarily due to the country's political and economic instability, but also

²⁷⁴Rachel Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine," *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2008): 67, <http://www.cceol.com/asp/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=871893ed9eee4771a614ad30be1330ef>.

²⁷⁵Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, "The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism," *Review of Central and East European Law* 39, no. 3–4 (November 18, 2014): 217, doi:10.1163/15730352-00000019.

²⁷⁶John Edwin Mroz and Oleksandr Pavliuk, "Ukraine: Europe's Linchpin," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 3 (1996): 56, doi:10.2307/20047580.

²⁷⁷Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States," 56.

²⁷⁸Kuzio, "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?," 3.

due to the Union's reluctance "to support Ukraine too openly for fear of antagonizing Russia,"²⁷⁹ which led to Russia gaining control of Ukraine's foreign policy for many years.

The reason I stated both Ukraine and the EU's major flaws in tightening their relationship is that it is time to reevaluate these mistakes and cooperate in a more efficient way for the outcomes that could benefit both Ukraine and the Union itself. First and foremost, the EU would be more influential and even more popular within Ukraine than it is now if it officially stated Ukraine's potential membership—a fact that multiple policy makers and scholars have repeatedly mentioned in the past. For instance, Rachel Vanderhill suggests that, "[i]f membership were a serious offer, then the EU would be in a better position to influence the Ukrainian reform process."²⁸⁰ Volodymyr Nakonechniy states that "[t]he more Ukraine accomplishes, the bigger support from the European politicians,"²⁸¹ and creates some kind of a circle of the successful establishment of the EU-Ukraine relations.

The European Union, as a regional organization that is preoccupied with the security issues, would also benefit from offering membership to Ukraine. By highly prioritizing this goal, the political system of Ukraine might not have a place for any anti-democratic regimes in the future. The growing future generation would see the contrast between the pro-Russian and pro-European governance, and, thus, would gradually confirm its complete Western-devoted foreign policy orientation instead of going back and forth between Russia and Europe.²⁸² Furthermore, the reputation of the European Union recently has been negatively marked because of the

²⁷⁹F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Place in European and Regional Security," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 257, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036693>.

²⁸⁰Vanderhill, "The EU and Non-Accession States," 71–72.

²⁸¹Наконечний(Nakonechniy), "Україна в глобалізаційних та інтеграційних процесах (Ukraine in the Globalization and Innovation Processes)," 255.

²⁸²Dragneva and Wolczuk, "The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism," 242.

number of such internal issues as Britain's desire to leave the Union, Greece's economic downfall, and the European economic and migration crises. But by demonstrating verbal support and offering technical and financial assistance to Ukraine²⁸³ the Union could reinforce the value of its main principles and regain a positive image globally. Ultimately, by only mentioning Ukraine's future integration and reengaging it, the EU does not make any explicit anti-Russian statements.²⁸⁴

In agreement with Timothy Snyder, the point is that "membership in the EU requires a sovereign and functional state,"²⁸⁵ the evidence of which is not yet seen in Ukraine's current performance, an example of which could be the resignation of the former Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatseniuk due to the inability of politicians bringing "real changes in the country."²⁸⁶ Based on the results of my survey, the population of different ages is not satisfied with the work of a 'new' government because no major improvements have been made since the destructive beginning of the year 2014. Moreover, the conflict with Russia is negatively impacting Ukraine's domestic performance, but at the same time it is "driving Ukrainians to find their own way of forming their national identity" and strengthening the national idea of Ukraine as one that is refusing to be associated with Russia; it is intensifying the sentiment of an Ethnic

²⁸³George Soros, "A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine," *The New York Review of Books*, accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/02/05/new-policy-rescue-ukraine/>.

²⁸⁴Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander J. Motyl, "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 3 (2009): 117–118, <http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora88&collection=journals&index=journals/fora&id=500>.

²⁸⁵Snyder, "Integration and Disintegration," 704.

²⁸⁶"Ukraine's Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk Resigns," *Foreign Policy*, accessed May 10, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/10/ukraines-prime-minister-arseniy-yatsenyuk-resigns/>.

Ukrainian nationalism within the country. The “unprecedented scope and power unseen in other countries has helped Ukraine to stay strong against Russian aggression.”²⁸⁷

Another confirmation of Ukraine’s inadmissibility and distinctiveness from its neighbor, made by historiographer Alisa Lukashenko, lies in the fact that “Ukraine did not become Russia for the five preceding centuries” even during violent times of its nation identity’s suppression and Russification strategies.²⁸⁸ She further argues that the notion of a European identity and integration is closer to the Ukrainian population for the reason that unlike the Russian version of integration, which constitutes “the unconscious manipulation of masses [and] collective silent obedience,” Ukrainians would be able to express their individual Ukrainian identity on the grounds of equal partnership and shared values within a broader European community.²⁸⁹

Lastly, many scholars, including Ronald Suny, indicate that Russia and its population still does not have a stable and affirmative comprehension of what their national identity is.²⁹⁰ Suny outlines three variations of Russian statehood and nationalism which are: the restoration of a union consisting of the highest possible number of the former Soviet Union states, the Slavic unity of a Great Russia, and the formation of a republic of Russian speakers and diaspora.²⁹¹ In this context, it is clear that modern Ukraine with its large majority of people holding Ethnic Ukrainian identification does not fit into any of these categories. It is also clear that the majority of the Ukrainian population would not favor a restoration of the Soviet Union, a sentiment that is shared by all the other post-Communist states that have benefited a great deal from the

²⁸⁷Soros, “A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine.”

²⁸⁸Лукашенко (Lukashenko), “Проблема української самоідентифікації в межах світових інтеграційних процесів (The Problem of Ukrainian Identity within the Global Integration Processes),” 228.

²⁸⁹Ibid.

²⁹⁰Suny, “Provisional Stabilities,” 148–149.

²⁹¹Ibid.

democratic development and would have no incentive to return to Soviet communism. Secondly, Ukrainians would dispute the status of a concept that assumes Ukrainians as ‘Little Russians’ that belong to the Slavic unity of the Great Russia. And finally, the third version is Russian language-based and sees the unified Russian republic consisting of Russian-speaking populations and diasporas. Here too, Ukrainians have increasingly come to take pride in the Ukrainian language as the means of discourse. As a result, none of the variations of the Russian idea of a nation are even close to current Ukraine’s future aspirations in terms of nation- and state-building, which upholds Ukraine territorial integrity, sovereignty, and freedom as Ukraine’s main goals that are desired to be realized on its path to a European future.

It goes without saying that Ukraine’s official accession into the European Community is not on the horizon primarily because of its political and economic complications. Given that most of the prospective EU accession states are unstable, the possibility of the imminent enlargement of the Union is slim,²⁹² although the idea of it could significantly transform Ukraine in a more democratic way. Besides, the project of European integration should be gradual, with constant and equal degree of dedication from both sides – Ukraine and the EU. Kostyantyn Eliseev underlines that this project should also become a “national project, practical and oriented towards the attainable and tangible result for an ordinary Ukrainian,”²⁹³ meaning that it is important for the regular population of Ukraine to feel the benefits of progressive development of Ukraine as a European country. Given all that Ukrainian politicians have done in practice hasn’t been reflected positively on the population of Ukraine, and their promises of a

²⁹²John McCormick and Jonathan Olsen, *The European Union: Politics and Policies*, Fifth Edition, Fifth Edition edition (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2013), 89.

²⁹³Костянтин Єлісеєв (Yeliseev), “Україна–ЄС: що день прийдешній нам готує,” *Національна безпека і оборона*, no. 1 (2009): 7, http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD105_ukr_3.pdf.

better European future were only talks, it would be very beneficial for the country to keep going if the results of progress can be seen in the lives of Ukrainians, no matter how small.

The current President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, emphasized Ukraine's determination to take on this not easy task of getting rid of corruption and establishing a fair political system in order to become closer to Europe, which he demonstrated by signing the political and economic parts of the Association Agreement. Nevertheless, even with the new Europe-oriented government, there are a lot of remaining inconsistencies in the rule of law and social services that must be resolved before proceeding to the European transformation of the country. With that being said, the most essential part of Ukraine's permanent focus on becoming European is the people and their willingness to live in a country of shared European values, appropriate standards of living, and increased emphasis of the government on the people and their needs.

Having analyzed various domestic and international factors that contributed to the development of Ukrainian national identity since the beginning of the country's independent existence until the present day, the conclusion could be made that over time the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism with its emphasis on democracy and European integration has become a lot stronger and more prevalent than the Russian-oriented Eastern Slavic national idea. The pro-Western Ukrainians -initiating the two revolutions, advocating for democratic reforms, and fighting for the truthful governmental representation of their country- are the face of the Ethnic Ukrainian nationalism that has been the driving force behind their strength, resistance, and unity. It is this type of nationalism that is going to realize the idea of a European Ukraine in the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aslund, Anders. "Left behind: Ukraine's Uncertain Transformation." *The National Interest*, 2003, 107–16. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42895646>.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. "National Images and International Systems." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1959, 120–31. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173107>.
- Dean, James. "Ukraine: Europe's Forgotten Economy." *Taylor & Francis, Ltd.* 43, no. 6 (December 2000): 93–108. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40722044>.
- Diuk, Nadia. "Finding Ukraine." *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (2014): 83–89. doi:10.1353/jod.2014.0041.
- Dragneva, Rilka, and Katarzyna Wolczuk. "The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Challenges of Inter-Regionalism." *Review of Central and East European Law* 39, no. 3–4 (November 18, 2014): 213–44. doi:10.1163/15730352-00000019.
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. "What Is Ethnicity?" In *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, 2 edition., 1–18. London ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2002.
- Espinass, Gary D. "Ukraine's Defense Engagement with the United States." *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010): 53–63. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24384334>.
- Karatnycky, Adrian, and Alexander J. Motyl. "Key to Kiev: Ukraine's Security Means Europe's Stability." *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 3 (2009): 106. <http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora88&collection=journals&index=journals/fora&id=500>.
- Kubicek, Paul. "Delegative Democracy in Russia and Ukraine." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27, no. 4 (1994): 423–41. http://shron.chtyvo.org.ua/Kubicek_Paul/Delegative_democracy_in_Russia_and_Ukraine_anhl.pdf.
- . "Reviewed Work: How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy by Anders Åslund." *Slavic Review* 69, no. 2 (2010): 471–72. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25677124>.
- Kuzio, Taras. "EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004?" *The European Institute for Security Studies*, no. 47 (November 2003). <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ47.pdf>.

- . “Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine Defining the ‘Other.’” *Ethnicities* 1, no. 3 (2001): 343–65.<http://etn.sagepub.com/content/1/3/343.short>.
- . “Nationalism, Identity and Civil Society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, no. 3 (September 2010): 285–96. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2010.07.001.
- . “Ukraine and the Southern Hemisphere.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 211–20.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036691>.
- Larrabee, F. Stephen. “Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics.” *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2010): 33–52.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24384333>.
- . “Ukraine’s Place in European and Regional Security.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 249–70.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036693>.
- Lockwood, Dunbar. “‘Commonwealth’ Leaders Pledge Arms Cuts, Central Control.” *Arms Control Today* 21, no. 10 (1991): 18–25.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23624722>.
- Lutsevych, Orysia. “The Future Isn’t Orange.” *The World Today* 68, no. 4 (2012): 28–28.
- Malygina, Katerina. “Ukraine as a Neo-Patrimonial State: Understanding Political Change in Ukraine in 2005-2010.” *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe*, 2010, 7–27. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43293343>.
- McCormick, John, and Jonathan Olsen. *The European Union: Politics and Policies*. Fifth Edition, Fifth Edition edition. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2013.
- Meirowitz, Adam, and Joshua A. Tucker. “People Power or a One-Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest.” *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 2 (2013): 478–90.<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12017/full>.
- Menon, Rajan, and Alexander J. Motyl. “Counterrevolution in Kiev: Hope Fades for Ukraine.” *Foreign Affairs*, 2011, 137–48.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23039635>.
- Motyl, Alexander J. “Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovych’s Rise, Democracy’s Fall.” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2010): 125–36.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25680985>.
- Mroz, John Edwin, and Oleksandr Pavliuk. “Ukraine: Europe’s Linchpin.” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 3 (1996): 52. doi:10.2307/20047580.

- Neumann, Iver B. "Self and Other in International Relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (June 1, 1996): 139–74. doi:10.1177/1354066196002002001.
- Portnov, Andrii. "Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies." *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 723. doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.723.
- Radnitz, Scott. "The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet 'revolutions.'" *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 2 (2010): 127–46.
<http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2010/00000042/00000002/art00001>.
- Schulz, John J. "Crimean Challenge Adds to Ukrainian Woes." *Arms Control Today* 24, no. 3 (1994): 20–20.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23625511>.
- Sherr, James. "Ukraine: Democratic Dangers." *The World Today* 66, no. 1 (2010): 25–27.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41962437>.
- Shulman, Stephen. "Ukrainian Nation-Building under Kuchma." *Problems of Post-Communism* 52, no. 5 (2005): 32–47.<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10758216.2005.11052211>.
- Simmons, Katie, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. "Ukrainian Public Opinion: Dissatisfied with Current Conditions, Looking for an End to the Crisis." *Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project*. Accessed November 2, 2015.
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/06/10/3-ukrainian-public-opinion-dissatisfied-with-current-conditions-looking-for-an-end-to-the-crisis/>.
- Snyder, Timothy. "Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World." *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 695. doi:10.5612/slavicreview.74.4.695.
- Soros, George. "A New Policy to Rescue Ukraine." *The New York Review of Books*. Accessed April 30, 2016. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/02/05/new-policy-rescue-ukraine/>.
- Stegniy, Oleksandr. "Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: 'Lost in Translation'?" *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 27, no. 1 (March 2011): 50–72. doi:10.1080/13523279.2011.544383.

- Stronski, Eugene Rumer, Paul, and Eugene Rumer. "Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at Twenty-Five—A Baseline Assessment." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Accessed May 2, 2016. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/14/russia-ukraine-and-eurasia-at-twenty-five-baseline-assessment/imsv>.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. "Constructing Primordialism: Old Histories for New Nations." *The Journal of Modern History* 73, no. 4 (2001): 862–96. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/340148>.
- . "Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia," 2006. <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228899560266>.
- Tarasyuk, Borys. "Ukraine in the World." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 20 (1996): 9–15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036682>.
- "Ukraine Declares Its Independence - Jan 26, 1918." *HISTORY.com*. Accessed November 2, 2015. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ukraine-declares-its-independence>.
- "Ukraine's Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk Resigns." *Foreign Policy*. Accessed May 10, 2016. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/10/ukraines-prime-minister-arseniy-yatsenyuk-resigns/>.
- Vanderhill, Rachel. "The EU and Non-Accession States: The Cases of Belarus and Ukraine." *New Perspectives. Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2008): 53–76. <http://www.cceol.com/asp/getdocument.aspx?logid=5&id=871893ed9eee4771a614ad30be1330ef>.
- "Verkhovna Rada." *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*, February 9, 2016. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Verkhovna_Rada&oldid=704062580.
- Zhughe, Scott. "Political Prosecution: EU-Ukraine Relations in Turmoil." *Harvard International Review* 34, no. 2 (2012): 6–7. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42763512>.
- "Бернар Анрі-Леві: Україна носить ідею Європи (Bernard-Henri Lévy: Ukraine Carries the Idea of Europe)." *Громадське радіо*, February 20, 2015. <http://hromadskeradio.org/programs/intervyu/bernar-anri-levi-ukrayina-nosyt-ideyu-yevropy>.

- Єлісеєв, Костянтин (Yeliseev, Kostyantyn). “Україна–ЄС: щоденьприйдешнійнамготує (Ukraine-EU: what does the future bring).” *Національна безпека і оборона*, no. 1 (2009): 6–8. http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD105_ukr_3.pdf.
- Зажигаєв, Б. В. (Zazhigaev). “Україна на перехресті глобальної політики. Частина 1: Україна та європейська система сучасних міжнародних відносин (Ukraine on the Crossroads of Global Politics. Part 1: Ukraine and the European System of International Relations).” *Проблеми міжнародних відносин*, 2010, 76–89. <http://dspace.nbu.gov.ua/handle/123456789/58744>.
- Кармазіна, Марія (Maria Karmazina). “Демократи, соціалісти й ‘третя сила’ у боротьбі за владу (1991-1994 рр.) (Democrats, Socialists, and the ‘Third Force’ in the Struggle for Power (1991-1994)).” *Політичний менеджмент* 6 (2005): 49–57. <http://dspace.nbu.gov.ua/bitstream/handle/123456789/8898/6-karmazina.pdf?sequence=1>.
- Лукашенко, А. І. (Lukashenko). “Проблема української самоідентифікації в межах світових інтеграційних процесів (The Problem of Ukrainian Identity within the Global Integration Processes).” *Проблеми міжнародних відносин*, 2010, 219–31. <http://dspace.nbu.gov.ua/handle/123456789/58857>.
- Наконечний, В. М. (Nakonechniy). “Україна в глобалізаційних та інтеграційних процесах (Ukraine in the Globalization and Innovation Processes).” *Проблеми міжнародних відносин: [зб. наук. праць/наук. ред. Канцелярчук БІ та ін.]*. – К.: КИМУ, 2010, 248–59. <http://www.kyumu.edu.ua/vmv/v/p01/18%20nakonechniy.pdf>.
- Полякова, Лариса (Larysa Polyakova). “Аспекти взаємодії Президента України і Верховної Ради. Спроба посилення президентської влади (1994-2004 рр.) (Aspects of the Relationship between the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada. Attempt of Strengthening the Presidential Power (1994-2004)).” *Схід* 5, no. 105 (2010): 103–8. <http://dspace.nbu.gov.ua/handle/123456789/22169>.
- Сацький, Павло Вікторович (Pavlo Viktorovych Satskyi). “Регіональний фактор у формуванні загальнодержавної вертикалі виконавчої влади в Україні у першій половині 1990-х рр. (Regional Factor in Shaping National Vertical of Executive Power in Ukraine in the First Half of the 1990s).” *Інститут історії України НАН України*, 2007. <http://www.ir.kneu.edu.ua:8080/handle/2010/8877>.

APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY



1919–1922	First period of independence or ‘The Ukrainian War of Independence’
1954	The transfer of the Crimean Peninsula to Ukraine by N. Khrushchev
1991	The collapse of the Soviet Union
August 24, 1991	Declaration of Ukraine’s Independence
1991–1994	Presidential term of Leonid Kravchuk
1994–1999	1 st Presidential term of Leonid Kuchma
1999–2004	2 nd Presidential term of Leonid Kuchma
Nov–Dec 2004	The Orange Revolution
2004–2010	Presidential term of Viktor Yushchenko
2010–2013	Presidential term of Viktor Yanukovich
Winter 2013	The Revolution of Dignity/EuroMaidan
March 2014	The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
March 2014 – Present day	Russian military intervention in the eastern borders of Ukraine followed by the war in the Donbass region (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts)
May 2014 – Present day	Presidential term of Petro Poroshenko

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTICIPANTS OF THE SURVEY

Ідея Європейської України
The Idea of a European Ukraine

Опитування громадської думки
Opinion Survey

Будь ласка, дайте *детальну персональну* відповідь/думку на дані запитання. Усі відповіді залишаться *анонімними*, тому буду дуже вдячна за Вашу чесність!
Please provide a *detailed personal* answer/opinion on the given questions. All answers will remain *anonymous*, so your honesty will be much appreciated!

Вік/Age _____

Стать/Sex Жіноча/F _____ Чоловіча/M _____

Національність/Nationality _____

Регіон України/Region of Ukraine _____

Рід діяльності/Occupation _____

1) Чи вважаєте Ви, що Україна належить до Європейських країн?

Do you think that Ukraine is a European country?

Якщо Ви – громадянин України, чи вважаєте Ви себе проєвропейським чи проросійським? If you are Ukrainian, do you identify yourself more pro-European or pro-Russian?

Якщо Ви не є громадянином України, яким Ви бачите українське населення: проєвропейським чи проросійським? If you are not a Ukrainian citizen, do you see the Ukrainian population as pro-European or pro-Russian?

2) Які, на Вашу думку, загальні цінності розділяють усі європейські країни? Яких цінностей не вистачає в Україні?

In your opinion, what are common values shared amongst all European nations? Which of these is Ukraine lacking, if any?

3) Яка Ваша позиція щодо анексії Криму? Обґрунтуйте свою думку.

What is your stance on Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula? Do you agree or disagree, and why do you think this?

4) Як Ви ставитеся до можливого територіального та політичного від'єднання Донецької та Луганської Народних Республік?

What do you think about the possible territorial and political separation of the Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics?

5) Чи брали Ви участь у Революції Гідності?

Did you participate in the Revolution of Dignity?

6) Які перешкоди стоять перед Україною на шляху до європеїзації?

What are some of the obstacles Ukraine is facing on its path toward Europeanization?

7) Як би Ви оцінили ефективність політичної, соціальної та економічної роботи нинішнього уряду? Більше того, як Ви вважаєте, чи задовольняє уряд потреби своїх громадян? Чи почуваете Ви себе захищеними та почутими нинішнім урядом?

How would you evaluate the current government's effectiveness politically, socially, and economically? In addition, how do you think the government accommodates the needs of its citizens? Do you feel cared for and heard by the current Ukrainian government?

8) Чи вважаєте Ви достатньою підтримку України іншими країнами? Іншими словами, чи могли б інші країни посприяти вирішенню конфлікту в Україні?

Do you think the international community provides enough support to Ukraine? In other words, is there anything else other countries could do to help Ukraine?

9) Чи хотіли би Ви, щоб Україна була частиною Європи? Чому так або чому ні?

Do you want Ukraine to be a part of Europe? Why or why not?

10) Як Ви ставитеся до конфлікту на сході України? Який Ви прогнозуєте цьому кінець? Нарешті, який сценарій розвитку подій є найкращим закінченням цього конфлікту?

How do you feel about the conflict in the Eastern region of Ukraine? How do you see it ending? Lastly, what is the best case scenario in terms of this conflict ending?