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dc.contributor.authorPfitzner, Kiran
dc.date.accessioned2021-05-17T02:46:28Z
dc.date.available2021-05-17T02:46:28Z
dc.date.issued2021-05-16
dc.identifier.citationPfitzner, Kiran Markus Selvaraj. (2021, May 16). Politics in Battle: The Army and the State in the German-Soviet War .en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://digitalrepository.wheatoncollege.edu/handle/11040/31699
dc.description134 leaves.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 128-134).
dc.description.abstractThe thesis argues that both Germany and the Soviet Union entered the Second World War with fundamentally counterproductive relationships between political and military authorities. The German Army sought to operate without regard to the political goals of Nazi leadership and thereby maintaining the army’s traditional independence. By contrast, the Red Army, decimated by Stalin’s purges, was a shell of its former self, subjected to political officers and a regime of terror that stifled tactical and operational initiative and military thought. Throughout the German-Soviet War, Nazi leadership sought to reduce the independence of the German Army through hyper-politicization and in so-doing destroyed its technical abilities, just as Soviet leadership developed greater confidence in the Red Army and allowed its officers greater freedom to prosecute the war successfully. Ultimately, it is concluded that armies must be brought to adhere to political objectives without destroying their ability to conduct operations.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontentsIntroduction -- Background through the Interwar -- Civil-Military Relations through -- Institutional Conflict -- Pride and Insecurity -- Introduction -- The German Army - Moltke to Halder -- The Red Army - The Tsar to Tukhachevsky -- Conclusion -- Theory - Independence and Integration -- Introduction -- The German Army - Clausewitz to Beck -- The Red Army - Lenin to Isserson -- Conclusion -- Operational Art and its Salience to War and Politics -- Origins and Importance -- German Operational Art -- Soviet Operational Art -- The War -- Impact of Ideology - Totalitarianism on the Battlefield -- The Nazification of the Heer -- Recovering from the Great Purge -- Effects of the Dictators - Hitler and Stalin as commander-in-chief -- Hitler - The Omnipotent Corporal -- Stalin - The Compromises of Necessity -- Conclusions
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherWheaton College. (Norton, Mass.)en_US
dc.subjectUndergraduate research.
dc.subjectUndergraduate thesis.
dc.subject.lcshWorld War, 1939-1945 -- Soviet Union.
dc.subject.lcshSoviet Union -- Politics and government -- 1936-1953.
dc.subject.lcshWorld War, 1939-1945 -- Germany.
dc.subject.lcshWorld War, 1939-1945 -- History.
dc.subject.lcshWorld politics.
dc.subject.lcshArmed Forces.
dc.subject.lcshMilitary history.
dc.subject.lcshNazis -- History -- 20th century.
dc.titlePolitics in Battle: The Army and the State in the German-Soviet Waren_US
dc.typeThesisen_US


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